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SHAFER v. SOUTH CAROLINA: ANOTHER
MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO REMOVE
JUROR IGNORANCE AS A FACTOR IN
CAPITAL SENTENCING
Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 (2001)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Shafer v. South Carolina,1 the Supreme Court once again con-
fronted South Carolina's practice of refusing to inform capital juries
choosing between a sentence of life imprisonment or death that the
defendant would be statutorily ineligible for parole if sentenced to a
life term. Seven years earlier, in Simmons v. South Carolina,' the
Court held that a capital defendant must be allowed to inform the jury
of his prospective parole ineligibility, but only where: 1) the prosecu-
tor had raised the issue of the defendant's future dangerousness, and
2) the only alternative to death is life imprisonment without the pos-
sibility of parole.' Subsequently, in response to the 1996 amend-
ments to South Carolina's capital sentencing scheme, the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court asserted that the rule in Simmons was no longer
applicable in South Carolina.' However, in Shafer the United States
Supreme Court rebuked this conclusion, holding that the "Simmons
rule" did indeed still apply to the new South Carolina sentencing
scheme.'
Unfortunately, in so doing the Court perpetuated the qualified
rule of Simmons. The Constitution, and fundamental notions of jus-
tice, would have been better served had the Court taken this opportu-
nity to affirm an unqualified right of capital defendants to inform ju-
ries that they would be ineligible for parole if sentenced to life
532 U.S. 36 (2001).
2 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
3 Id. at 178 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
4 Shafer, 532 U.S. at 46-47.
5 Id. at 51.
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imprisonment. Extensive research, much of which was before the
Court as it made its decision, has shown that capital jurors are in des-
perate need of being informed of the basic terms of their sentencing
task. Where jurors are uninformed, imposition of the death sentence
based in part on the arbitrary and capricious factor of juror ignorance
seems inevitable. Furthermore, these problems are evident regardless
of whether the prosecutor raises the issue of the defendant's future
dangerousness, or whether the only alternative to death is life impris-
onment without parole. An unqualified rule would also save time and
effort at all levels in its application. These defects in the Simmons
rule are amply illustrated by the facts surrounding the Shafer decision
itself. Finally, an unqualified rule of disclosure would better comport
with the Court's Eighth6 and Fourteenth Amendment7 jurisprudence
concerning capital punishment. For all of these reasons, a capital de-
fendant's prospective parole ineligibility under a life sentence should
always be disclosed to the jury.
II. BACKGROUND
The United States Supreme Court inaugurated its modem death
penalty jurisprudence in 1972, with the landmark case Furman v.
Georgia.' In that decision, the Court struck down the capital sentenc-
ing schemes of Georgia and Texas, both of which granted unfettered
discretion to sentencing juries, for violating the Eighth Amendment's
proscription of cruel and unusual punishment.9 While two justices
argued that capital punishment should be declared unconstitutional
per se," ° the holding ultimately struck down the specific capital sen-
tencing schemes at issue because under them the death penalty was
"pregnant with discrimination,"'' "wantonly ... and freakishly im-
posed," 12 and without a "meaningful basis for distinguishing the few
cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it was
not.""3 One of the primary rationales for the decision was the Court's
recognition that the death penalty is unique in its moral significance
and irrevocability, thus demanding a heightened degree of scrutiny
6 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
8 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
9 Id. at 239-40.
10 Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 371 (Marshall, J., concurring).
I /Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring).
12 Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
13 Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
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under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.14 The Court also rec-
ognized that the constitutional proscription of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment was a dynamic one, evolving along with our society's stan-
dards of decency. 5 From these first principles, the Court embarked
on the project of delimiting the constitutional requirement that ad-
ministration of the death penalty be based on a fully and fairly rea-
soned determination that death is indeed the appropriate punishment
in a particular case.16
A. SUPREME COURT CASELAW BEFORE SIMMONS
Just four years after Furman, the Court passed down five deci-
sions assessing the constitutionality of various states' capital sentenc-
ing schemes. 7 In Gregg v. Georgia,8 the Court found Georgia's re-
formed capital sentencing scheme to be compatible with the Eighth
Amendment,' explicitly declaring that capital punishment was not
per se unconstitutional.2" The Court first noted that, because the con-
stitutional proscription of cruel and unusual punishment is intrinsi-
cally tied to the community's evolving standards of decency, the
Court should show considerable deference to the state legislative
process as the states attempted to construct constitutionally valid
capital sentencing schemes.2' But the Court reaffirmed the principle
of Furman that, because of the death penalty's unique severity, "it
could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a sub-
stantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious
manner."
22
14 See, e.g., id. at 286-91 (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing the magnitude of the
moral difference between the death penalty and mere incarceration).
15 Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring).
16 See, e.g., Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 172 (1994) (Souter, J., concur-
ring).
17 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts
(Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). It should be noted that all of these cases were
essentially decided by Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens. Justices Marshall and Brennan
consistently voted to strike down the death penalty schemes at issue, and the remaining Jus-
tices (White, Burger, Rehnquist and Blackmun) voted to uphold the schemes at issue in each
case.
18 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The holding and analysis in Gregg were mirrored in the com-
panion case of Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
19 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207.
20 Id. at 186-87.
21 Id. at 174-76.
22 Id. at 188.
2002]
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The Court then established some basic mechanisms by which a
sentencing scheme could avoid such a result. 3 First, it noted that
sentencing discretion should be "suitably directed and limited."24
Second, the Court noted that the decision must be fully informed, in-
cluding the consideration of evidence regarding the defendant's indi-
vidual character and circumstances which might ordinarily be inad-
missible.25 To accomplish this, the Court strongly suggested the
implementation of a bifurcated proceeding so that such evidence
might be presented only after a determination of guilt has been
made. 6 Since the new Georgia sentencing scheme did appropriately
direct and limit sentencing decisions by directing the jurors to con-
sider ten statutory aggravating circumstances, and employed a bifur-
cated proceeding in which the jury might fully consider any relevant
mitigating evidence,27 the Court held that it was constitutional.28
In the companion case of Jurek v. Texas,29 the Court also upheld
the reformed capital sentencing scheme of Texas." Of particular
concern for the Court was the fact that the new Texas scheme re-
quired jurors to consider whether the defendant was likely to pose a
"continuing threat to society."31 Although acknowledging that such
considerations were inherently speculative, the Court did not find this
fact alone to cause a constitutional infirmity. 2 Indeed, the Court
noted that "any sentencing authority must predict a convicted per-
son's probable future conduct when it engages in the process of de-
termining what punishment to impose."33  The critical factor was
whether the jury would be allowed to consider any relevant mitigat-
ing evidence the defendant might proffer that could affect that deter-
mination. 4  The Court noted that, "[it] is essential... that the jury
23 Id. at 189-91.
24 Id. at 189.
25 Id. at 189-90.
26 Id. at 190-91.
27 Id. at 163-67.
28 Id. at 206-07.
29 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
30 Id. at 276.
31 Id. at 272.
32 Id. at 274-75.
33 Id. at 275.
34 Id. at 271. The Court further emphasized that,
[a] jury must be allowed to consider on the basis of all relevant evidence not only why a death
sentence should be imposed, but also why it should not be imposed.... Thus, in order to meet
the requirement of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, a capital-sentencing system must al-
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have before it all possible relevant information about the individual
defendant whose fate it must determine."35 Since the new Texas sen-
tencing scheme did allow for the unfettered consideration of the de-
fendant's mitigating evidence in a bifurcated proceeding, the Court
found that it was consistent with the demands of the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments.36
The Court further refined the principles established in Furman in
the case of Woodson v. North Carolina.37 The capital sentencing
scheme at issue in that case made the death penalty mandatory for
certain particular offenses.38 The Court concluded that the scheme
violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because it merely
"papered over" the problems exposed in Furman.39 Specifically, the
Court recognized that under such mandatory schemes, jurors gener-
ally tailored their finding of guilt to the offense that carried the pen-
alty they thought appropriate.4" Particularly troubling for the Court
was the fact that the sentencing scheme did not allow for an individu-
alized assessment of the character and history of the defendant and
the circumstances of his crime.4 The Court concluded that such an
assessment was necessary under the Eighth Amendment in capital
cases, because the finality of the sentence demanded a heightened
"need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate
punishment in a specific case."4 Because North Carolina's sentenc-
ing scheme did not allow for such a fully informed and individualized
assessment, it was struck down.
4 3
The Court further developed the principles of its death penalty
jurisprudence the following year in Gardner v. Florida.44 That case
concerned the imposition of the death penalty by a trial judge who re-
lied in part on a presentence investigation report that was not fully
low the sentencing authority to consider mitigating circumstances.
Id.
35 Id. at 276.
36 Id.
37 428 U.S. 280 (1976). The holding and analysis of Woodson were mirrored in the
companion case of Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
38 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 285-86.
39 Id. at 302, 305.
40 Id. at 302-03.
41 Id. at 304-05.
42 Id. at 305.
43 Id.
44 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
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disclosed to either the defense counsel or the prosecutor.4" The Court
once again cited to the moral severity and finality of capital punish-
ment as considerations which demanded that "any decision to impose
the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than
caprice or emotion."46 The Court also noted that its prior decisions
had scrutinized not only specific sentencing results, but also the pro-
cedures which led to them.47 Thus, the Court concluded that "peti-
tioner was denied due process of law when the death sentence was
imposed, at least in part, on the basis of information which he had no
opportunity to deny or explain."48
The Court next dealt with the requirements of the Eighth
Amendment in the context of capital sentencing in Lockett v. Ohio.49
In that case, the Court dealt with a sentencing scheme that limited the
sentencer's consideration of evidence concerning the defendant's his-
tory and character and the circumstances of the offense."0 The Court
reaffirmed the Eighth Amendment principle that capital sentencing
decisions must be based on an individualized assessment which fully
takes into account, as mitigating factors, any evidence the defense
proffers concerning the circumstances of the crime or of the defen-
dant's character and background."' Once again, this principle was
predicated on capital punishment's uniquely irrevocable character.5 2
The Court concluded, "[t]he limited range of mitigating circum-
stances which may be considered by the sentencer under the Ohio
statute is incompatible with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
To meet constitutional requirements, a death penalty statute must not
45 Id. at 3 51.
46 Id. at 357-58.
47Id. at 358.
48 Id. at 362. Significantly, the decision in Gardner was predicated solely on the re-
quiremcnts of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, rather than on the Four-
teenth Amendment's Clause in conjunction with the Eighth Amendment's proscription of
cruel and unusual punishment.
49 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
50 Id. at 589. Specifically, the Ohio statute limited the sentencer's consideration to three
narrowly defined mitigating circumstances:
(1) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it. (2) It is unlikely that the offense would
have been committed, but for the fact that the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong
provocation. (3) The offense was primarily the product of the offender's psychosis or mental de-
ficiency, though such condition is insufficient to establish the defense of insanity.
Id. at 607.5 1 Id. at 604.
52 Id. at 605.
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preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors."53
In Eddings v. Oklahoma,54 the Court considered a case in which
a trial judge refused to consider evidence of the sixteen-year-old de-
fendant's troubled background in his determination that death was the
appropriate punishment.55 Predictably, the Court held that the rule of
Lockett had been violated, and that while the sentencer was free to
decide what weight to assign mitigating evidence, it was not permit-
ted to peremptorily exclude such evidence from its consideration.56
The trial judge's decision was reversed and remanded for a determi-
nation of the appropriate sentence based on a full consideration of the
mitigating evidence.57 In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor
succinctly expressed the fundamental principle of the Court's modem
capital punishment jurisprudence to date. She wrote, "[b]ecause sen-
tences of death are 'qualitatively different' from prison sentences,
this Court has gone to extraordinary measures to ensure that the pris-
oner sentenced to be executed is afforded process that will guarantee,
as much as is humanly possible, that the sentence was not imposed
out of whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake." 58
The Court seemed to rein in its rigid scrutiny of State sentencing
schemes in California v. Ramos.59 In that case, the Court considered
California's "Briggs Instruction," which had been mandated in all
capital cases by a voter referendum.6" The instruction alerted sen-
tencing juries that a sentence of life imprisonment without the possi-
bility of parole may be commuted by the Governor to a sentence
which did allow for the possibility of parole, but it did not inform
those juries that a sentence of death might likewise be commuted.6"
The California Supreme Court found the instruction to be unconstitu-
tional, but the United States Supreme Court reversed that decision.62
The Court first re-iterated the principle, established in Gregg, that
considerable deference should be shown to the state legislative proc-
" Id. at 608.
54 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
55 Id. at 109.
56 Id. at 113-14.
57 Id. at 117.
58 Id. at 117-18 (citations omitted).
59 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
60 Id. at 995 n.4.
61 Id. at 995-96. As the Court acknowledged, an instruction that a death sentence may be
commuted by the governor had previously been declared unconstitutional by the California
Supreme Court. Id. at 1011-12.
62 Id. at 996-97.
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ess in determining what factors are relevant to juries in their capital
sentencing determination.63
The Court then advanced three lines of argument in support of its
ruling that the Briggs Instruction did not violate the Eighth Amend-
ment. First, the Court rebuked the proposition that the instruction in-
vited the jury to consider matters too speculative on which to form a
properly reasoned sentencing decision, namely the possibility that a
future governor would indeed commute the life sentence.64 The
Court reasoned that the true significance of the instruction was that it
drew the attention of the jury to the possible future dangerousness of
the defendant.65 Since the Court had ruled in Jurek that future dan-
gerousness was a proper subject for the jury to consider in its capital
sentencing decision, the Briggs Instruction was likewise not too
speculative.66 Second, the Court dismissed the contention that the in-
struction drew the juror's attention to matters outside the proper
scope of their consideration.67 The Court reiterated its contention that
the essential effect of the instruction was to bring to the jury's atten-
tion the issue of the defendant's future dangerousness.68 Finally, the
Court denied that the instruction skewed the jury's analysis by sug-
gesting that a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole was uncertain, due to the possibility of commutation, but a
sentence of death was not similarly uncertain.69 The Court reasoned
that even if a "balancing" instruction was provided, informing juries
that a sentence of death carried with it a similar possibility of com-
mutation, this would not impact the jury's desire to see the defendant
off the streets permanently. Furthermore, the Court argued that such
an instruction might actually prejudice the defendant by de-
emphasizing the gravity of a sentence of death in the minds of the ju-
rors.7" Throughout the opinion, the Court emphasized that the Briggs
Id. at 1000.
64 Id. at 1001-02.
65 Id. at 1003.
66 Id. As Justice Marshall pointed out, the Court nowhere addressed the actual probabil-
ity that a capital defendant in California would have his sentence commuted, nor the ability
ofjurors to assess that probability. Id. at 1018-21.
67 Id. at 1005-06.
68 Id. at 1008.
69 Id. at 1010-11. Under the California State Constitution, the governor was empowered
to commute or pardon both life sentences and the death sentence. Jd. at 1010 n.24.
70 Id. at 1011-12. The Court cited to People v. Morse, 388 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1964), for the
proposition that a balancing instruction might actually prejudice the defendant. In that case,
the California State Supreme Court declared an instruction that the death sentence was sub-
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instruction did convey a legally correct fact, and opined "[s]urely, the
respondent cannot argue that the Constitution prohibits the State from
accurately characterizing its sentencing choices.""1
Finally, the Court again addressed capital sentencing scheme
standards in Skipper v. South Carolina.7 2 In that case, the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court had determined that information concerning a de-
fendant's conduct in jail awaiting trial was irrelevant for purposes of
sentencing, and hence could not be considered as mitigating evidence
showing his adaptability to life in prison.73 The majority opinion, cit-
ing to Lockett and Eddings, found that the Eighth Amendment de-
manded the admission of all relevant mitigating evidence proffered
by the defendant, and that evidence of good behavior in prison while
awaiting trial qualified as such." The concurring minority75 argued
that the decision should have been based on the narrower due process
grounds, established in Gardner, that the defendant must be allowed
to rebut evidence and arguments used against him.76
B. THE SIMMONS DECISION
In Simmons v. South Carolina, " the defendant was convicted of
the capital murder of an elderly woman.7" Because of his prior
convictions for assault, he would have been parole ineligible under
South Carolina's repeat violent offender provision.79 However, the
trial judge refused the defense counsel's request to inform the jury
that the defendant would be statutorily ineligible for parole if sen-
tenced to life imprisonment rather than death.8" Subsequently, the
jury returned from deliberations to explicitly inquire of the trial judge
ject to the governor's power of commutation unconstitutional because jurors would then pre-
sume that their sentence of death would not be final, but would rather be subject to further
consideration by the governor.
71 Ramnos, 463 U.S. at 1005 n.19.
72 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
73 Id. at 3.
74 Id. at 4.
75 The concurrence was by Justice Powell, with Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist joining. Id. at 9.
76 Id. The prosecution had argued during closing arguments that Ronald Skipper would
likely commit violent crimes in prison. Id.
77 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
78 Id. at 156.
79 S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-640 (Supp. 1993). This was not the same provision under
which Wesley Shafer was rendered parole ineligible, but it is still in effect in South Carolina.
80 Sinnons, 512 U.S. at 158-60. During an in camera hearing on the subject, the de-
fense counsel introduced testimony by a State pardon board attorney to confirm that Sim-
mons would never be paroled. He also introduced statewide public opinion survey by the
2002]
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from deliberations to explicitly inquire of the trial judge what the
State's parole policy would be with regard to Simmons." However,
the trial judge refused to give the jury a straight answer, and the an-
swer he did give strongly suggested that parole would indeed be a fu-
ture possibility for Simmons. 2 The jury returned shortly thereafter
with a sentence of death.83
The plurality opinion84 found that, by refusing to inform the jury
of Simmons's parole ineligibility, the State had deprived him of his
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.85 The plurality
relied primarily on the principle, established in Gardner and reiter-
ated in Skipper, that a capital defendant must have a full opportunity
to rebut the charges made against him.86 In this case, the prosecution
had clearly raised the issue of Simmons's future dangerousness to the
community.87 Since the fact that Simmons was statutorily parole in-
eligible directly militated against the charge that he would pose a fu-
ture threat to society at large if sentenced to life imprisonment, the
trial court could not properly withhold that information.88 The plural-
ity emphasized that the defense counsel was merely asking for a le-
gally correct instruction.89 Moreover, the plurality recognized that
prospective jurors might be largely uninformed as to the recent trend
of denying parole eligibility to violent offenders, leading them to pre-
sume that a capital defendant would be eligible for parole if sen-
University of South Carolina (further discussed below) which showed that prospective jurors
in South Carolina are likely to presume that a capital defendant sentenced to life imprison-
ment will be released on parole, and that this is likely to be a factor in their sentencing deci-
sion. Id. at 158.
81 Id. at 160. The jury asked, "Does the imposition of a life sentence carry with it the
possibility of parole?" Id.
82 Id. The trial judge instructed, "You are instructed not to consider parole or parole eli-
gibility in reaching your verdict. Do not consider parole or parole eligibility. This is not a
proper issue for your consideration. The terms life imprisonment and death sentence are to
be understood in their plain and ordinary meaning." Id.
83 Id.
84 Justice Blackmun wrote for the plurality. He was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter,
and Ginsburg. Id. at 156.
85 Id. at 171.
86 Id. at 161-62.
87 Id. During its closing argument, the prosecution argued, "Your verdict should be a
response of society to someone who is a threat. Your verdict will be an act of self-defense."
Id. at 176.
88 Id. at 163-64.
89 Id. at 169.
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tenced to life imprisonment.9" They further recognized that "it is en-
tirely reasonable for a sentencing jury to view a defendant who is eli-
gible for parole as a greater threat to society than a defendant who is
not."'" Thus, the State had created a "false dilemma" for the jury, in
that it was led to believe that the only way to prevent Simmons from
posing a future threat to society would be to sentence him to death.92
The plurality concluded that this situation was repugnant to the re-
quirements of due process in the context of capital sentencing.93
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in which Chief
Justice Rhenquist and Justice Kennedy joined.94 O'Connor agreed
with the plurality's basic line of argument, that the right of rebuttal
predicated on Skipper and Gardner required that a capital defendant
be allowed to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility where the
prosecution argued future dangerousness.9" However, citing Ramos,
O'Connor went on to stress that the Court had shown great deference
to the States in deciding whether information regarding parole eligi-
bility should be presented to the jury.96 Hence, she emphasized that
due process requires that the defendant be allowed to inform the jury
of his parole ineligibility only as a form of rebuttal to the prosecu-
tion's argument of future dangerousness. 97 Ultimately, the narrow
holding held out by O'Connor, and hence a majority of the Court,
was: "Where the State puts the defendant's future dangerousness in
issue, and the only available alternative sentence to death is life im-
prisonment without the possibility of parole, due process entitles the
defendant to inform the capital sentencing jury - by either argument
or instruction - that he is parole ineligible."98
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Stevens joined, concurred
with the result but argued that a broader rule should be imple-
90Id. at 169-70.
91 Id. at 163.
92 Id. at 161-62. Justice Blackmun wrote,
In this case, the jury reasonably may have believed that petitioner could be released on parole if
he were not executed. To the extent this misunderstanding pervaded the jury's deliberations, it
had the effect of creating a false choice between sentencing the petitioner to death and sentenc-
ing him to a limited period of incarceration.
Id. at 161.
93 Id. at 162.
94 Id. at 175.
95 Id. at 175-76.
96 Id. at 176-77.
97 Id. at 178.
98 Id.
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mented.99 Justice Souter argued that a defendant should be allowed
to have the jury informed of his parole ineligibility regardless of
whether the prosecution has raised the issue of future dangerous-
ness."' He reasoned that such a rule was compelled by the Eighth
Amendment principle that a defendant is entitled to a fully and fairly
reasoned moral judgment that death is the appropriate judgment.1"'
He further argued that here, the real issue was the proper definition of
the basic terms of the jury's decision, the provision of which is "an
indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned determination of whether a
defendant shall live or die."'0 2 Since it was clear that the jury might
be misinformed as to the true meaning of "life imprisonment" due to
the relatively recent development of repeat offender and truth-in-
sentencing provisions, such as the one applicable to Simmons, the
Eighth Amendment entitled the defendant to ensure that the jury was
accurately informed as to the terms of its sentencing decision. °3 And
in light of the fact that the jury explicitly inquired as to the parole
policy applicable to Simmons, and the trial judge refused to give
them a straight answer, the prospect that Simmons's death sentence
was based at least in part on juror misperception seemed certain.'0 4
This result was clearly repugnant to the Eighth Amendment."'0
99 Id. at 172. The Simmons decision also included a concurrence from Justice Ginsburg
and a dissent from Justice Scalia, in which Justice Thomas joined. The main point argued by
Justice Ginsburg was that it would be sufficient for defense counsel to inform the jury of the
defendant's parole ineligibility. Id. at 174-75 (Ginsburg, J. concurring). Justice Scalia as-
serted that the decision was beyond the scope of the Court's constitutional authority with
respect to the States, as established by the Due Process Clause, prior precedent, and the pre-
vailing practice of the people. Id. at 178-79 (Scalia, J. concurring). He also reiterated that
the States have been accorded a great degree of deference in determining if a jury is to be
informed about the possibility of the defendant's parole. Id. at 183 (Scalia, J. concurring).
Finally, he contended that refusal to admit information about Simmons's parole ineligibility
did not rise to the level of "fundamental unfairness" which the Court had previously em-
ployed as a standard in assessing due process, and that the possibility that the jury's decision
was predicated on this lack of information was "far fetched." Id. at 184 (Scalia, J. concur-
ring).
1oo Id. at 172.
101 Id.
I2 Id. (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976)).
1o3 Id. at 173.
104 Id. at 173-74.
105 Id. at 174. Justice Souter also argued that in such circumstances the trial judge should
be required to inform the jury that the defendant is statutorily parole ineligible. Id. at 173.
He reasoned that the Court has long recognized that the instructions of the trial judge carry
the greatest weight with the jury, and since the issue here was one of law, the trial judge
ought to be required to establish it as such. Id. Ultimately, Justice Souter found that
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C. POST-SIMMONS DEVELOPMENTS
A number of cases decided since Simmons have further deline-
ated the ruling in that case. In O'Dell v. Netherland, °6 the Court de-
termined that the holding in Simmons was a "new" rule within the
meaning of Teague v. Lane.'07 Hence, the rule was inapplicable to
defendants whose death sentence had been passed down before the
decision in Simmons."8 The Court denied certiorari in Brown v.
Texas, 109 a case in which a capital defendant in Texas had been de-
nied the opportunity to present evidence that if sentenced to life im-
prisonment he could not be paroled for at least thirty-five years.
However, Justice Stevens'1I wrote to acknowledge the tension be-
tween the facts of that case and the holding in Simmons,"' and to
point out the disturbing practice in Texas of informing non-capital
juries of all the parole ramifications of their sentencing decision
while completely barring that information from capital juries."' He
went on to emphasize that the denial of certiorari had no precedential
value and did not endorse the practice." 3 In Ramdass v. Angelone,"4
the Court held that the Simmons rule did not apply to a defendant
who, at the time of the sentencing proceeding, had not yet qualified
as parole ineligible under Virginia's three-strikes law." 5 The defen-
dant in that case had received a jury verdict of guilty on what would
ostensibly be his third strike offense under the law, but judgment had
not yet been entered by the trial court, and thus the three strikes law
had not officially taken effect." 6 The Court held that such impending
"[b]ecause ... juries in general are likely to misunderstand the meaning of the term 'life im-
prisonment' in a given context ... the judge must tell the jury what the term means, when
the defendant so requests .... By effectively withholding from the jury the life-without-
parole alternative, the trial court diminished the reliability of the jury's decision that death,
rather than that alternative, was the appropriate penalty in this case." Jd. at 173-74.
106 521 U.S. 151 (1997).
107 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
1o8 0'Dell, 521 U.S. at 153.
1o9 118 S. Ct. 355 (1997).
110 Stevens was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. Id. at 355.
I Id.
112 Id. at 356.
113 Id.
14 530 U.S. 156 (2000).
115 One pertinent fact in the case was that the jury returned from its sentencing delibera-
tions to specifically inquire of the trial judge what Ramdass's parole status would be under
Virginia law. Id. at 162.
116 Id. at 179-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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parole ineligibility was insufficient, and that Simmons only applies
where the defendant is in fact statutorily ineligible for parole at the
time of sentencing.l"7
D. THE SOUTH CAROLINA CAPITAL SENTENCING LAW
Under current South Carolina law, juries in capital cases take
part in a bifurcated proceeding in which they first make a determina-
tion of guilt, and then make a sentencing determination in a separate
proceeding.118 During the sentencing phase, the defendant is given
wide latitude in presenting mitigating evidence." ' As the sentencing
proceeding concludes, jurors are requested to make two distinct de-
terminations. First, they are to determine if a statutory aggravating
circumstance has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 ' If they
fail to make such a finding, then their role in sentencing ends and
they do not make a sentencing recommendation.' In that event, the
trial judge will sentence the defendant to either life imprisonment or a
thirty-year mandatory minimum term of years.' On the other hand,
if the jury does find that a statutory aggravator has been proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt, they must choose between a sentence of life
imprisonment or death.' Any person so sentenced to life imprison-
ment will be ineligible for parole or any other early release pro-
gram.1
24
The South Carolina sentencing scheme had changed significantly
since the trial of Jonathan Simmons.'25 Under the former system, if a
statutory aggravator was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, a
sentence of life imprisonment with a mandatory minimum of twenty
years was imposed. 126 If a statutory aggravator was found, then the
sentencing alternatives would be death or life imprisonment with a
mandatory minimum of thirty years.'27 What made Simmons parole
ineligible was a distinct provision that applied to repeat violent of-
117 Id. at 165-66.
118 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (A), (B) (Supp. 1998).
119 Id. at § 16-3-20 (B).
120 Id. at § 16-3-20 (C).
121 Id.
122 Id. at § 16-3-20 (B).
123 Id. at § 16-3-20 (A), (B).
124 Id. at § 16-3-20 (A).
125 See, e.g., Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 46 n.3 (2001).
126 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (A) (Supp. 1 993).
127 , ,
[Vol. 93
SHAFER v. SOUTH CAROLINA
fenders. 128 This repeat offender provision is still in effect, although it
is now redundant in the context of capital sentencing.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. FACTS OF THE CRIME
On the night of April 12, 1997, eighteen-year-old Wesley Aaron
Shafer 1 9 and his friends Justin Porter and Adam Mullinax attempted
to rob a convenience store. 3' The three arrived at the "Hot Spot" in
Union County, South Carolina at 1:00 a.m."' As they cased the
store, the few customers present departed because they suspected
trouble. 32  That left store clerk Ray Broome alone behind the
counter."' 3 A few minutes passed, after which Broome momentarily
left his post. 34 Porter then attempted to break into the cash register,
but was unsuccessful.'35 As Broome returned, the three departed and
proceeded to a nearby wooded area in order to discuss how to perpe-
trate the robbery.'36 At that point Shafer, according to a statement he
later made to the police, "just snapped." '37 He reentered the Hot
Spot, walked toward the counter where Broome was standing, and
without warning shot him in the head from several feet away. 38 He
then proceeded to another side of the counter, and after pausing mo-
mentarily, shot Broome once again in the head.'39 Shafer and Porter
tried once again to force open the register, but failed. 4 ° As Shafer
and Porter departed, they were seen by witnesses who soon discov-
ered Broome lying behind the counter. 4' Shafer later confessed to
the killing, and the whole incident was recorded on the store's secu-
128 § 24-21-640.
129 Shafer, 532 U.S. at 40; State v. Shafer, 531 S.E.2d 524, 526 (S.C., 2000).







137 Id. at 526-27.






rity camera. 4 '
B. THE TRIAL
After a grand jury indicted Shafer on charges of murder, at-
tempted armed robbery and conspiracy, the prosecutor informed
Shafer that he would be seeking the death penalty and intended to
present evidence of Shafer's "propensity for [future] violence and
unlawful conduct."' 4 3 Shafer was convicted on all counts, and the
trial entered the penalty phase.' Prior to the closing arguments,
there was an in camera hearing to determine the content of the jury
instructions.'45 The defense counsel argued that under Simmons and
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the instruc-
tions should explicitly inform the jury that Shafer would be statuto-
rily ineligible for parole if sentenced to a life term. 46 The prosecutor
objected, arguing that Simmons was inapplicable because he had not
explicitly argued that Shafer posed a future danger to the commu-
nity. '47 The defense counsel countered that the prosecutor had put on
witnesses who directly attested to Shafer's potential for future dan-
gerousness, and so could not now claim that the issue of future dan-
gerousness had not been raised.'48 The trial judge decided that the
prosecutor had not raised the issue of future dangerousness to the de-
gree necessary to trigger the Simmons rule, and denied the defense
counsel's request to inform the jury of Shafer's prospective parole in-
eligibility.'49 The defense counsel then made a motion to be allowed
to read the statute directly to the jury during his closing arguments,
and the prosecutor again objected. 5' The trial judge denied this mo-
tion as well. 5'
After the prosecutor's closing argument, the defense counsel re-
newed its plea to inform the jury of Shafer's prospective parole ineli-
142 Id. at 526 n.4.
143 Shafer, 532 U.S. at 40.
144 State v. Shafer, 531 S.E.2d at 526.
145 Shafer, 532 U.S. at 41.
146 Id.
147 Id..
148 Id. Specifically, witnesses had testified to the effect that Shafer had committed a post
arrest assault and other infractions while in jail awaiting trial. Id.149 Id at 41-42.
150 Id. at 42.
151 Id.
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gibility. 5 2 The defense counsel argued that the prosecutor had just
repeated the testimony of witnesses who had made direct statements
as to Shafer's potential for future dangerousness. 53 While the trial
judge expressed concern that the prosecutor had toed the line, he once
again denied the defense counsel's plea."5 4 In the end, the trial judge
instructed the jury simply that "life imprisonment means until the
death of the defendant."' '5 Defense counsel once again objected, and
was overruled by the trial judge." 6
After about three and a half hours of deliberation, the jury re-
turned with a questionnaire for the judge.'57 They asked two ques-
tions: "1) Is there any remote chance for someone convicted of mur-
der to become elig[i]ble for parole? 2) Under what conditions would
someone convicted of murder be elig[i]ble for parole?"'58 The de-
fense counsel once again urged the judge to simply read the portions
of the South Carolina capital murder statute pertaining to parole in-
eligibility to the jury."9 The prosecution countered that under South
Carolina law, the jury should not be allowed to consider state parole
policy in its sentencing determination. 6 ' The trial judge once again
sided with the prosecution. 6' He informed the jury only that, "life
imprisonment means until the death of the offender .... Parole eli-
gibility or ineligibility is not for your consideration."6' Eighty min-
utes later the jury returned with a sentence of death.'63 Shafer ap-
pealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court.
C. THE DIRECT APPEAL
Among other reasons, not relevant here, Shafer appealed on the
ground that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury as to
his statutory parole ineligibility if he were sentenced to a term of life
152 Id. at 43.
153 Id. Specifically, the prosecutor had dramatically repeated the words of a terrified
witness just after the crime: "they might come back, they might come back." Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 43-44,









imprisonment by the jury. 64 The South Carolina Supreme Court de-
nied the appeal and affirmed the rulings of the trial judge.16 The
court's basic line of argument was that the Simmons decisions should
be narrowly construed, and that a number of state and federal courts
had already done so.'66 Hence, the Simmons holding should be
strictly limited to its facts.'67 The court proceeded to distinguish the
present case from Simmons on the basis of the sentencing schemes
applicable in each case.'68
In Simmons, the old South Carolina sentencing scheme operated
such that when a capital jury found that a statutory aggravator had
been proven, it then had to choose between a sentence of life impris-
onment or death. 6 9 If no statutory aggravator were found, then the
trial judge would impose a sentence of life imprisonment, but with a
lesser minimum time served. 7 ' For Simmons, a life sentence would
have been without the possibility of parole in either case due to the
state's repeat violent offender provision.' 7' The new sentencing
scheme applicable in Shafer's trial worked essentially the same way,
but if the jury did not find that a statutory aggravator had been
proven, then the judge would have a choice between life imprison-
ment and a mandatory minimum thirty-year term of years.' Hence,
there would be three legally possible outcomes: a mandatory mini-
mum thirty-year term of years, a term of life imprisonment, and the
death penalty.'73 According to the South Carolina Supreme Court,
this was sufficient to distinguish the present case from Simmons, the
holding of which the court construed as follows: due process requires
that a defendant be allowed to inform the jury of his parole ineligibil-
ity only if the prosecution argues as to his future dangerousness, and
only if life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and death
are the only legally possible sentencing alternatives.'74
The South Carolina Supreme Court went on to address another
164 State v. Shafer, 531 S.E.2d 524, 527 (S.C., 2000).
165 Id.
166 Id. at 528.
167 Id.
168 Id.




173 State v. Shafer, 531 S.E.2d at 528.
174 Id.
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of Shafer's contentions: that the failure to inform the jury of Shafer's
prospective parole ineligibility violated the Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution."5 The South Carolina Supreme Court
conceded Shafer's argument that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
State from limiting the sentencing jury's consideration of any rele-
vant mitigating evidence which the jury might weigh against imposi-
tion of the death penalty. 7 6  However, citing to California v.
Ramos, 177 the court argued that the United States Supreme Court has
generally left it to the states to decide what substantive factors are
relevant in making a sentencing determination.178  The court then
cited to a line of United States and South Carolina Supreme Court
precedent establishing that parole ineligibility has not been consid-
ered a "mitigating factor" within the meaning of the Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, and that declining to inform juries of a capital
defendant's prospective parole ineligibility has not been held to vio-
late the Eighth Amendment. 179 The court further concluded that be-
cause juries are charged only with the task of choosing a sentence,
and not "legislat[ing] a plan of punishment," informing juries of a
capital convict's prospective parole ineligibility will only lead to in-
accuracy in the jury's sentencing determination.18 ° In other words,
because the South Carolina Supreme Court had previously deter-
mined that the issue of parole eligibility is irrelevant to a capital
jury's sentencing decision, it reasoned that presenting the jury with
such irrelevant information would only skew that decision, making it
"less reliable.,
1 8'
Shafer also argued that the trial court had erred in the supple-
mental instruction it gave in response to the jury questionnaire. ' He
contended that: 1) the trial judge should have informed the jury he
would have been statutorily parole ineligible if sentenced to life, 2)
the trial judge's actual response wrongly suggested that Shafer would
be eligible for parole if sentenced to life, and 3) the trial judge erred
in refusing to simply read the South Carolina statute governing parole
175 Id. at 529.
176 Id. (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 822 (1991); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 114(1982)).
177 463 U.S. 992, 1001 (1983).
178 State v. Shafer, 531 S.E.2d at 529.
179 Id. at 529-30.
180 Id. at 530-31.




eligibility for a capital convict sentenced to life imprisonment.'83 The
South Carolina Supreme Court summarily dismissed all three conten-
tions. 8 First, it reiterated that under South Carolina precedent a
capital defendant's parole eligibility is considered irrelevant with re-
gard to the sentencing determination. 85 Second, the court concluded
that because the supplemental jury instruction in this case appeared
less suggestive than the similar instruction issued in Simmons (also in
response to a jury questionnaire), it did not suggest that Shafer was
parole eligible.'86 Third, the court held that the trial judge did not err
in refusing to read the proffered portion of the relevant statute, be-
cause parole ineligibility was not a proper consideration for the jury
under South Carolina precedent. 8 ' The court further criticized Shafer
for proffering only the sections of the statute that would work in his
favor. 88
Chief Justice Finney wrote a dissenting opinion.'89 He first
noted that under the new South Carolina sentencing scheme, Shafer
would have been parole ineligible no matter what the sentence. 190
Even if the jury failed to find a statutory aggravator and the judge
sentenced him to a mandatory minimum thirty-year term of years,
Shafer would not be eligible for parole.' 9' Thus, under the present
South Carolina sentencing scheme, the jury's first question could
have simply been answered "no."' 92
Chief Justice Finney then conceded that Simmons did not control
the present case because future dangerousness had not been argued.'93
However, he contended that "the overriding principle to be drawn
from that decision is that due process is violated when a jury's specu-
lative misunderstanding about a capital defendant's parole eligibility
is allowed to go uncorrected."' 94 Since the trial judge's response to
the jury questionnaire did suggest that parole was a possibility for
183 Id.
184 Id. at 531-32.
185 Id. at 531.
186 1d.
187 Id. at 532.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 534.
190 Id. at 534 n.1.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 534 n.2.
194 Id. at 534.
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Shafer, the requisite "speculative misunderstanding" was clearly im-
plicated.19 Hence, Chief Justice Finney would have reversed on
those grounds.'96
Chief Justice Finney went on to argue that as a policy matter,
capital juries should always be informed that the defendant would be
parole ineligible regardless of the sentence.'97 He queried, "[t]he
specter of parole haunts every capital sentencing proceeding in this
State, and I cannot understand why, given the simplicity of our new
sentencing scheme in which no capital defendant is ever parole eligi-
ble, we would make a policy decision prohibiting the dissemination
of the truth."' 98
Shafer petitioned for a writ of certiorari on the issue of whether
the South Carolina Supreme Court had erred in its application of
Simmons, and certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme
Court. 1
99
V. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
South Carolina Supreme Court, and remanded for further considera-
tion on the issue of whether future dangerousness was in fact argued
by the prosecution.2"0 The Court began by reaffirming the holding of
Simmons, namely that "where a capital defendant's future dangerous-
ness is at issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death available
to the jury is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due
process entitles the defendant 'to inform the jury of [his] parole ineli-
gibility, either by a jury instruction or in arguments by counsel."'"2 '
The Court found that the South Carolina Supreme Court had incor-
rectly limited Simmons in relation to South Carolina's new sentenc-
ing scheme.02




198 Id. at 535.
199 Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 47 (2001).
200 Id. at 55. The majority opinion was authored by Justice Ginsburg.
201 Id. at 39 (quoting Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 165 (2000)).
202 Id. at 39.
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fact that, under the new sentencing scheme, there are three legally
possible sentencing outcomes: death, life imprisonment, or a manda-
tory minimum thirty-year term.2 3 Hence, according to the South
Carolina Supreme Court, the present case was distinguishable from
Simmons, where the only legally possible outcomes were life impris-
onment or death." 4 The Court found that this reasoning might be
persuasive had the jury's sentencing discretion actually encompassed
all three choices. 5 However, a more accurate and functional analy-
sis of the new South Carolina sentencing scheme revealed that this
was not the case.0 6
Under the new scheme, the jury was first to make a finding of
fact as to whether a statutory aggravating circumstance had been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.0 7 It is only if such a statutory ag
gravator is found that a jury will even consider what sentence to pass
down.208 And at that point there are only two alternatives: life im-
prisonment without the possibility of parole or death.20 9 If the jury
does not find a statutory aggravator to have been proven, then the
judge will determine the sentence, and it is only then that the third
sentencing option becomes a possibility. 20  The Court further ob-
served that the only reason that three sentencing outcomes are legally
possible when the jury retires is that, under the new sentencing
scheme, the jury is not required to reconvene in order to report its
finding that a statutory aggravator has been proven beyond a reason-
able doubt.2 ' Rather, they move on directly to decide the sentence.212
In fact, during oral argument the State acknowledged that, had the
jury been required to report its finding on the statutory aggravator be-
fore moving on to decide the sentence, the case would be indistin-
guishable from the facts of Simmons, and an instruction as to Shafer's
parole ineligibility would be required.213
The Court found this distinction to be entirely too vacuous to
203 Id. at 49.









213 Id. at 5 1 n.5.
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properly distinguish Simmons.2 14 To the extent that the jury would
decide upon a sentence at all, after it had found a statutory aggrava-
tor, it would only have a choice between life imprisonment and
death.215 Hence, the Court concluded that the facts of the present case
directly mapped on to the holding in Simmons.2 16 "We therefore hold
that whenever future dangerousness is at issue in a capital sentencing
proceeding under South Carolina's new scheme, due process requires
that the jury be informed that a life sentence carries no possibility of
parole.
2 17
The State of South Carolina proffered two alternative grounds on
which to support the South Carolina Supreme Court's affirmation of
Shafer's death sentence. 218 First, the State argued that the jury was
effectively informed of Shafer's prospective parole ineligibility by
the trial court's instructions to the jury and the defense counsel's
closing argument.21 9 Second, the State contended that no instruction
was required under Simmons because the prosecution had not argued
the issue of Shafer's future dangerousness. 2" The Court rejected'the
first argument, and remanded the case back to the South Carolina Su-
preme Court on the second.
2 21
As for the State's argument that the jury had been effectively in-
formed of Shafer's parole ineligibility, it pointed first to the defense
counsel's closing argument, in which he implored the jury that if they
spared Shafer's life he would die in prison.22 In addition, the State
noted that the trial judge had instructed the jury that "life imprison-
ment means until the death of the defendant., 23  In response, the
Court first noted that displacement of the long-standing tradition of
making parole available even to those sentenced to life imprisonment
is a relatively recent phenomenon, and so it is reasonable to conclude
that many prospective jurors are unaware of what precisely their
state's parole policy is. 224 The Court went on to conclude that the






220 Id. at 54-55.






State's argument must fail completely in this case, in light of the fact
that the jury actually sent the judge a questionnaire inquiring what the
State's parole policy was concerning one convicted of capital mur-
der."' Clearly, if the fact of Shafer's prospective parole ineligibility
had been effectively communicated to the jury, they would have had
no reason to ask the question in the first place.226 In addition, the
Court noted that the trial judge's evasive answer to the jury question-
naire did tend to suggest that parole was indeed a possibility for
Shafer under South Carolina law. 7
Finally, the State argued that, regardless of the other issues in the
case, Simmons should not be held applicable because the prosecutor
never made an argument as to Shafer's future dangerousness.228
However, the Court noted that the South Carolina Supreme Court
never squarely addressed this issue, but rather appeared to have as-
sumed it arguendo29 Hence, the Court concluded that this issue was
not ripe for resolution, and remanded the case back to the South
Carolina Supreme Court for a determination on this issue. 30
B. JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISSENT
The dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia was brief and general in
principle.2 3' He simply contended that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was only intended to allow the Court to en-
force then existing principles of the common law tradition.2 2 It was
not intended to give the Court the authority "to promulgate wise na-
tional rules of criminal procedure." '233 Hence, he took issue with the
Court's expanding its "death is different" jurisprudence, of which this
case he considered to be a part.234 He further fretted that the next
logical extension of the principle in Simmons would be to cases
where the jury had not sent out a questionnaire directly inquiring as





228 Id. at 53-54.
229 I.
230 Id. at 54.
231 Id. at 54-55.
232 Id. at 55.
233 Id. at 55 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
234 Id. at 56 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
235 Id.
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C. JUSTICE THOMAS'S DISSENT
The dissenting opinion of Justice Thomas supported the State's
contention that the jury had been effectively informed as to Shafer's
prospective parole ineligibility.23 6 He argued that the statements
made by the trial judge in his instructions, in combination with the
defense counsel's closing argument, "left no room for speculation by
the jury." 3 ' This was particularly true in contrast to the jury instruc-
tions in Simmons, where the trial judge informed the jury that "life
imprisonment" was to be defined according to its "plain and ordinary
meaning.""23 Here, by contrast, the trial judge instructed the jury that
"life imprisonment means until the death of the defendant." '239
Justice Thomas further attempted to explain away the jury ques-
tionnaire by inferring that it pertained only to Shafer's parole eligibil-
ity in the event that the jury did not return a sentencing recommenda-
tion at all.24 After all, he noted, the question asked about the parole
policy as applied to one convicted of murder generally, rather than
the parole policy with regard to one convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to life imprisonment by the jury.24 He further noted that if
the jury thought earlier release was a possibility in the event that they
did not find a statutory aggravator and decide upon a sentence them-
selves, then they were right because in such an event a mandatory
minimum thirty-year term of years would be a possible outcome.242
He then concluded that the jury did not need to know what sentencing
options were available to the trial court, and so the evasive maneu-
vers by the trial court in response to the questionnaire were justi-
fied.243 Finally, he fretted that the role of the Court was not to mi-
cromanage jury sentencing proceedings, because the Constitution
leaves that to the States.244
236 Id.
237 Id. at 56-57. Specifically, the trial judge had defined "life imprisonment" as "until
the death of the defendant" and "incarceration of the defendant until death." And the de-
fense counsel implored that if Shafer was sentenced to life imprisonment, he would die in
prison.
238 Id. at 56.
239 Id. at 56-57.
240 Id. at 57.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 57-58.




In reversing the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in
Shafer, the United States Supreme Court correctly applied the Sim-
mons rule to the new South Carolina capital sentencing scheme. The
South Carolina decision represented little more than a legalistic ruse,
and failed to properly distinguish Simmons. Unfortunately, the Court
declined to seize this opportunity to replace the qualified rule of
Simmons with an unqualified rule mandating the disclosure of a capi-
tal defendant's parole ineligibility under a life sentence in all cases
where such an option is present. Both the facts of Shafer itself, and a
growing body of academic research, demonstrate that capital juries
have a dire and unqualified need for complete and accurate informa-
tion as to the basic terms of their sentencing decision. This need is
nowhere more acute than where a capital jury has the option of sen-
tencing the defendant to life imprisonment without parole. More-
over, an unqualified rule would be simpler and more efficient to ap-
ply, thereby conserving valuable judicial resources. Finally, an
unqualified rule would better comport to the basic principles of the
Court's modem death penalty jurisprudence.
A. THE COURT'S MECHANICAL APPLICATION OF THE SIMMONS RULE
WAS LOGICALLY SOUND
The majority opinion in Shafer cannot be faulted for the logic of
its application of the rule in Simmons to the facts at hand. The South
Carolina Supreme Court's attempt to distinguish the two cases via the
mechanics of the state's new sentencing scheme was strained and ob-
tuse. Moreover, the further rationale forwarded by the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court in favor of withholding from the jury knowledge
of a capital defendant's parole ineligibility does not stand up to criti-
cal analysis.
Clearly, the jury considers a sentencing recommendation under
the new South Carolina sentencing scheme if, and only if, they have
already found that a statutory aggravating circumstance has already
been proven."' At that point, the jury has only two sentencing op-
tions: life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or death.
2 46
Hence, with regard to the sentencing alternatives available to Shafer's
jury, this case squarely maps on to the facts of Simmons. The fact
that there was technically a third possible outcome not even available
245 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (Supp. 2001).
246 Id. at § 16-3-20 (A), (B).
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to the jury is entirely too vacuous a distinction on which to properly
distinguish the two cases. Clearly, the point in Simmons was that the
jury must have only one sentencing alternative other than death-life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole-at the time the sen-
tencing determination is made. 47 That is where the constitutional in-
firmity of the "false dilemma" between death and a defacto term of
years comes into play due to the jury's misperception of the defen-
dant's parole eligibility.248 And the State itself conceded in oral ar-
gument that, had the jury simply been required to report its finding of
a statutory aggravator to the trial judge before moving on to the sen-
tencing determination, the distinction between the two cases would
have completely evaporated.249 Therefore, the Court was completely
justified in finding that the South Carolina Supreme Court had incor-
rectly limited the rule in Simmons."' °
In support of its decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court also
contended that informing jurors of a capital defendant's parole ineli-
gibility would reduce accuracy in sentencing decisions, an assertion
which seems completely untenable.25" ' The fact that a capital defen-
dant is parole ineligible is crucial in defining the basic terms of the
jury's sentencing task. To refuse to give the jury adequate informa-
tion to understand those basic terms can only inject caprice and arbi-
trariness into capital sentencing decisions, as jurors are forced to rely
on their best guess as to what "life imprisonment" really means. And
the South Carolina majority's contention appears even more inexpli-
cable when one considers that the United States Supreme Court had
previously acknowledged the prospect of a "false dilemma" in sen-
tencing decisions by misinformed jurors in Simmons."'2 As Chief
Justice Finney indicated in his dissent, there is simply no rational jus-
tification for prohibiting the dissemination of accurate sentencing in-
formation to the jury, particularly where the outcome of cases might
be affected.253
What's more, the South Carolina majority went so far as to ar-
gue, "jurors perform their task completely when they decide the mat-
247 Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 51 (2001).
248 Simons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 161-62 (1994).
249 Shafer, 532 U.S. at 51 n.5.
250 Id. at 40. See also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 804 (2001) (indicating that the
South Carolina Supreme Court's holding was "objectively unreasonable").
251 State v. Shafer, 531 S.E.2d 524, 530-31 (S.C., 2000).
252 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 161-62.
253 State v. Shafer, 531 S.E.2d at 534-35.
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ter assigned to them upon the evidence before them. What happens
thereafter is of no concern of theirs." '254 This statement is an obvious
non-sequitur. A sentencing determination simply has no meaning
other than as a determination of what is to happen to the defendant
"thereafter." Hence, capital jurors need full and accurate information
as to what "life imprisonment" means if they are to fulfill their ap-
pointed function with any degree of accuracy. And the South Caro-
lina majority's contention that informing jurors as to a capital defen-
dant's parole ineligibility will produce inaccurate sentencing results
is patently absurd.
Finally, the Court rightly rebuked the contention of South Caro-
lina255 and Justice Thomas256 that the jury was effectively informed of
Shafer's parole ineligibility by the aggregate of the trial judge's in-
structions and the defense counsel's closing argument. As the major-
ity opinion pointed out, this contention is simply untenable in light of
the fact that the jury explicitly asked the trial judge what the state's
parole policy was for defendants in Shafer's position. 57
In addition, Justice Thomas's further arguments to the contrary
simply do not hold any water. For one, he points out that the ques-
tions asked by the jury were general ones, and not directed specifi-
cally to their sentencing option of life imprisonment.258 But clearly a
high degree of legal exactitude in formulating questions cannot be
expected of laypersons. 59 Furthermore, under the South Carolina
sentencing scheme, the jury would not even consider sentencing
unless they had found that a statutory aggravator existed beyond a
reasonable doubt. 6 It is only then, while weighing the sentencing
options of life imprisonment or death, that the issue of parole would
occur to them. Hence, it seems highly probable that their question,
although somewhat vague, was directed at Shafer's parole eligibility
if he were sentenced to life imprisonment by them. On the other
hand, if they were considering the prospective sentence before mak-
254 Id. at 531 (citing State v. Atkinson, 172 S.E.2d 111, 112 (S.C. 1970)).
255 Shafer, 532 U.S. at 54.
256 Id. at 57-58 (Thomas, J. dissenting). Justice Scalia's dissent will not be addressed
here because the basis of his argument is not the merits of the case, but rather a very general
argument as to the Court's constitutional authority. The validity or invalidity of Justice
Scalia's brand of strict constructionism is obviously well beyond the scope of this paper.
257 Id. at 53.
258 Id. at 57 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
259 Indeed, with all due respect to the service of the jurors, these particular laypersons did
not even manage to spell "eligible" correctly. Id. at 44.
260 S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20 (C) (Supp. 2001).
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ing a factual determination as to whether the statutory aggravator had
been proven, then they were clearly engaged in jury misconduct un-
der South Carolina law by conditioning their finding of fact as to the
statutory aggravator on Shafer's prospective punishment.261 So either
the jury was confused as to the basic meaning of the law they were
asked to apply, or they were engaged in deliberate misconduct con-
trary to the trial judge's express instructions. However, considering
the similar juror confusion and more precise juror question in Sim-
mons, it appears the former was almost certainly the case.262
Justice Thomas's comparison of the jury instructions in Simmons
and Shafer also falls flat. 63 The instruction in the Simmons trial was
that the term "life imprisonment" was to be construed in its plain and
ordinary meaning.264 The instruction in Shafer's trial was that "life
imprisonment" means "until the death of the defendant." 6 ' So in
other words, the trial judge in Shafer spelled out the plain meaning
that the trial judge in Simmons merely alluded to. That hardly seems
like a substantive improvement. In both cases the trial judge com-
pletely failed to address the real issue of the jury's inquiry: the pro-
spective parole eligibility of the defendant. Defining life imprison-
ment as ostensibly "until the death of the defendant" merely begs the
question, "but is that with or without the possibility of parole?" And
that is precisely the question that the juries in both cases asked.
B. THE COURT'S MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO IMPLEMENT AN
UNQUALIFIED RULE OF DISCLOSURE WHICH WOULD BE MORE
SOUND, JUST AND EFFICIENT
While the Court properly refuted the South Carolina Supreme
Court's attempt to distinguish the facts in Shafer from those in Sim-
mons, the Court nonetheless missed a crucial opportunity to broaden
the Simmons rule to its proper scope. An extensive body of knowl-
edge has been assembled which unequivocally establishes the dire
need of capital juries to be fully informed as to the basic terms of
their sentencing task.266 Significant aspects of this research were be-
261 See id. (established aggravating circumstances do not include prospective sentence of
the offender).
262 Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 160 (1994).
263 Shafer, 532 U.S. at 56-57 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
264 Id. at 56 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
265 Id. (Thomas, J. dissenting).
266 See, e.g., William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by Default: An Empirical
Demonstration of False and Forced Sentencing Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 TEX. L.
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fore the Court as it decided the outcome in Shafer.26 7 Moreover, the
facts in Shafer itself illuminate several reasons why an unqualified
rule of disclosure should replace the Simmons rule.
For example, even if the Court were to insist on applying the
conceptual framework of Simmons, there is a compelling case to be
made that future dangerousness should be presumed to be placed "at
issue" by the State in all capital trials. Capital defendants should
have the right to answer this inevitable concern by informing juries
that they would be ineligible for parole if sentenced to life imprison-
ment. On the other hand, even if the issue of future dangerousness
were truly absent from the jury's deliberations, this would not re-
move the possibility of prejudicial error based on juror misperception
of parole eligibility. The need for a jury instruction as to a capital de-
fendant's parole ineligibility would remain, if only to allow capital
juries to properly calibrate the degree of punishment which befits the
crime. So in all cases, the significant possibility of juror error should
be corrected as a matter of course by ensuring the jury is aware of the
full meaning of their sentencing decision.
Another factor favoring an unqualified rule of disclosure is judi-
cial economy. By implementing the convoluted restrictions of the
Simmons rule, the Court has already wasted judicial resources at the
highest level, as Shafer itself demonstrates. Finally, there is clearly a
basis for such an unconditional rule of disclosure in the capital pun-
ishment jurisprudence of the Court. Indeed, such a rule would better
comport with that jurisprudence then the Simmons rule, which is ul-
timately without rational support by either policy or precedent.
1. The Need to Inform Juries of a Capital Defendant's Parole Ineligibility
In considering Shafer's appeal, the Court had at least two docu-
ments before it that clearly illuminated the need for informing capital
juries if the defendant was ineligible for parole. The first was the
Simmons decision itself, in which the plurality opinion explicitly ac-
REv. 605 (1999) (presenting statistical analysis and anecdotal evidence from a multi-state
survey of hundreds of former capital jurors, as well as general background on other investi-
gations and surveys).
267 See generally, Brief for Amici Curae Cornell Death Penalty Project, Shafer v. South
Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 (2001) (No. 00-5250) (presenting statistical analysis of in-depth in-
terviews of former South Carolina jurors, as well as background on other investigations and
surveys). See also, Simons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 159 (1994) (acknowledging a
statewide public opinion survey of prospective South Carolina jurors revealing a near-
unanimous presumption that capital defendants sentenced to life imprisonment would be pa-
roled).
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knowledged a survey conducted by the University of South Carolina
which examined the presuppositions of prospective South Carolina
jurors with regard to the parole eligibility of capital defendants.268
The second was an Amicus Brief submitted by the Cornell Death
Penalty Project on behalf of Shafer.2 69
In Simmons, the plurality opinion explicitly acknowledged a
statewide public opinion survey conducted by the University of South
Carolina's Institute for Public Affairs.27 ° According to the survey,
only 7.1% of jury-eligible adults believed that a defendant sentenced
to life imprisonment in South Carolina would actually serve his full
term.2 7' Almost half of the respondents presumed that a convicted
murderer would serve less than twenty years in prison, and nearly
three-quarters believed such a convict would be released within
thirty years.2 72 In addition, more that seventy-five percent felt that if
they were called upon to serve as jurors in a capital case, the amount
of time a convicted murderer would actually be required to serve
would be "extremely important" or "very important" in their decision
to recommend life imprisonment or death. 73 The obvious inference,
acknowledged by the Court, is that South Carolina jurors might sen-
tence a capital defendant to death simply because they presumed he
would eventually be released under a life sentence.274
Further evidence of the impact on capital sentencing of juror
misperceptions concerning parole eligibility was presented to the
Court via an amicus brief by the Cornell Death Penalty Project.
2 75
That brief introduced a number of results from the research efforts of
the Capital Jury Project ("CJP"), a National Science Foundation-
funded multi-state investigation into the decision making process of
capital jurors. 76 The CJP has interviewed 916 jurors from 257 sepa-
rate capital trials in eleven different states.277 Included in that total
268 Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 159 (1994).
269 Amicus Brief, Shafer, (No. 00-5250).
270 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 159. The survey had been offered into evidence by defense




274 Id. at 161-62. See also id. at 177-78 (O'Connor, J.) (acknowledging that denial of
parole to capital defendants is a recent practice, of which prospective jurors may generally
be unaware).
275 Amicus Brief, Shafer, 121 S. Ct. 1263 (2001) (No. 00-5250).




are 187 jurors from South Carolina, representing fifty-three capital
cases which occurred between 1988 and 1997.278 The interviews of
South Carolina jurors showed that the median estimate of how long
capital murderers sentenced to life imprisonment would actually
serve was only seventeen years.27 9 And less than one percent of
South Carolina jurors believe that a capital murderer sentenced to life
imprisonment would never be released on parole.28 Thus, both
Shafer and Simmons would appear to have been all but guaranteed a
jury which misperceived the terms of a life sentence as applied to
them.
It is true that these studies are susceptible to the criticism that
they are dated. The new South Carolina sentencing scheme, which
renders all capital murderers sentenced to life imprisonment ineligi-
ble for parole, was not in effect until 1996.281 But looking beyond the
data presented in the Amicus Brief, the CJP has also found ignorance
of parole ineligibility to be pervasive in States where it was then the
law.282 For instance, the interviewees from Alabama, Missouri and
Pennsylvania were near unanimous in their ignorance of the fact that
the sentencing alternative to death for a capital defendant in their
state was life without the possibility of parole.8 Moreover, amongst
the forty-nine Pennsylvania jurors, twelve years was their median es-
timate of when a capital defendant sentenced to life imprisonment
would be released in that State, when in fact such a convict would be
ineligible for parole altogether. 84 These results are particularly dis-
turbing since all of the interviewees were former jurors in capital
cases.
285
278 Id. at 1.
279 Id. at 5.
280 Id.
281 S.C. CODc ANN. § 16-3-20 (A) (Supp. 2001).
282 Bowers & Steiner, supra note 266, at 670. Although this data was not presented in
the Amicus Brief explicitly, the Bowers article was cited numerous times throughout the
brief as a comprehensive source of information. The Bowers article contains comprehensive
statistical analysis of the CJP interviews, as well as numerous juror descriptions of their ac-
tual decision-making process.
283 Id. Only three out of the 164 jurors interviewed from these states got the answer
right. Likewise, fewer than one-in-five jurors from California knew that life imprisonment
would be without the possibility of parole for capital defendants in their state. Id. See also,
id. at 647 tbl.l (stating how many jurors were interviewed from each State).
284 Id. at 670. Significantly, Pennsylvania is the only state other than South Carolina
which presently refuses to inform capital jurors that life imprisonment would be without the
possibility of parole. See Commonwealth v. Speight, 677 A.2d 317, 326 (Pa., 1996).
285 Bowers & Steiner, supra note 266, at 670-71.
[Vol. 93
SHAFER v. SOUTH CAROLINA
With regard to South Carolina jurors, a baseline presumption that
capital murderers will be released on parole if sentenced to life im-
prisonment has been clearly established. And even though the sen-
tencing scheme has been changed so as to deny parole to capital de-
fendants generally, CJP research suggests that this information is not
likely to be readily absorbed by prospective jurors (or even former
jurors) without intervention by the trial court.286 Indeed, the fact that
the jury in Shafer inquired about the availability of parole in the first
place confirms this inference. 87
The Amicus Brief also reported that, while sixty-six percent of
capital jurors who believed that a life sentence would result in less
than twenty years of actual imprisonment voted for death, only forty-
three percent of those who believed that the defendant would serve
twenty years or more voted for the death penalty.288 This obviously
suggests a direct correlation between the degree of juror mispercep-
tion about parole eligibility and the likelihood of the imposition of
the death penalty. Personal interviews conducted by the CJP have
further confirmed this inference, particularly where life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole was a sentencing option. 89 For ex-
ample, one South Carolina juror who had voted for death reported, "I
made it known at that time that if this state had a life sentence law,
I'd go along with it. Life means life. You stay there until you die...
I wasn't interested in a man being executed. I was interested in him
being off the street."29 In another interview, a California juror who
mistakenly believed that a capital defendant would be paroled in thir-
teen years, when in fact he would have been ineligible for parole,
voted for death.29' He reported:
We were not in total agreement that he should have the death penalty but we were in
total agreement that he should not be back in society ... So we asked for the judge...
to instruct us again on ... whether this man, if we didn't give him the death penalty,
[would] have a possibility of parole. And he, for some reason, could not ... We did
not want to give him life in prison because we thought perhaps he might be paroled.
286 Id. Indeed, the CJP researchers noted that mass media and political rhetoric has only
exacerbated juror misperception of parole eligibility. Id. at 651.
287 Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 44 (2001). See also, Commonwealth v. Clark,
710 A.2d 31, 35 (Pa. 1998) (demonstrating that jurors in Pennsylvania remain uninformed as
to the true meaning of a life sentence to a capital murderer).
288 Amicus Brief at 6 n.5, Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 44 (2001) (No. 00-
5250).
289 See Bowers & Steiner, supra note 266, at 674-700.
290 Id. at 678.
291 Id. at 697.
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Given that option we had to give him the death penalty.
292
These reports confirm that there are occasions where jurors will insist
on life imprisonment without parole as the only appropriate alterna-
tive to death. And where they mistakenly believe that option is not
available, they will vote for death on the basis of that misperception.
As a further indicator of the relevance of parole eligibility in the
decision making process of capital jurors, the Amicus Brief also cited
an independent study which indicated that jurors explicitly inquired
about the possibility of parole or early release from a sentence of life
imprisonment in twenty-five percent of the cases where the death
sentence was returned. 293 That study examined the trial transcripts of
the 280 such cases in Georgia from 1973 through 1990, and found
seventy cases in which the jury so inquired.2 94 However, the author
acknowledged that because jurors are not necessarily aware of their
right to ask such questions, this number most likely underrepresents
the degree to which the issue of parole eligibility was a significant
consideration for these juries.2" The author also indicated that,
where such information was present, the record usually indicated that
only a short amount of time elapsed between the trial judge's invaria-
bly evasive answer and the return of the death sentence.296 In fact,
this pattern was evinced in the facts of both Simmons2 97 and Shafer,
as well. 298 Such a pattern strongly suggests that the issue of parole
eligibility was one of the last and most decisive issues considered by
both juries. Indeed, as the author of the study further pointed out, the
United States Supreme Court has itself recognized the principle that a
short time between a communication from the trial court and the re-
sponse of the jury is indicative of the degree of prejudicial impact of
that communication. 99
Thus, by all accounts the availability of a life without parole sen-
tencing alternative, and juror knowledge of that availability, is often
292 Id. at 697-98.
293 Amicus Brief at 11, Shafer, (No. 00-5250).
294 J. Mark Lane, "Is There Life Without Parole?": A Capital Defendant's Right to a
Meaningful Alternative Sentence, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 327, 335-36 (1993).
295 Id. at 336.
296 Id. at 337 n.52.
297 Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 160 (1994).
298 Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 45 (2001).
299 Lane, supra note 294, at 337 n.52 (citing Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 40
(1975)); see also Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 602, 615 (Va. 1999) (recogniz-
ing that jurors only inquire about parole when one or more of the members contemplates vot-
ing for a sentence less than the maximum, and the outcome hinges on parole eligibility).
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critical to the fate of capital defendants. This unequivocally estab-
lishes the need for a procedural mechanism to make that information
available to capital jurors, lest death sentences based on the arbitrary
and capricious factor of juror ignorance be inevitable. The Supreme
Court recognized this problem in Simmons, but refrained from pro-
viding the necessary remedy except in cases where future dangerous-
ness was placed at issue by explicit arguments from the prosecutor. 0
However, as the Amicus Brief and the Court's own prior precedent
makes clear, future dangerousness may reasonably be presumed to be
"at issue" in all capital trials.
2. A Presumption That the Issue of Future Dangerousness Is Always Raised
in Capital Trials
The Simmons rule only applies where "the State puts the defen-
dant's future dangerousness in issue."301 However, the case for a pre-
sumption that the issue of future dangerousness will always be put in
issue in capital trials is both compelling and obvious. Capital crimes
invariably involve violent acts of a particularly egregious nature,
which in and of themselves raise the specter of future violence. Un-
der South Carolina law, for example, only first degree murders com-
mitted under aggravating circumstances will even qualify for capital
punishment."0 Hence, the future dangerousness of the defendant will
almost always be a prime consideration for capital jurors. There are a
number of arguments that buttress this intuition.
For one, the research conducted by the CJP and presented in the
Amicus Brief establishes that future dangerousness is on the minds of
capital jurors even where the prosecutor fails to explicitly raise the
issue.3"3 The CJP study first identified South Carolina capital jurors
who responded that the prosecutor's arguments and evidence had
"not at all" raised the issue of the defendant's danger to the public if
ever released.30 4 In spite of the prosecutor's silence, fully two-thirds
of these jurors reported having discussed the need to prevent the de-
300 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 161-62; Id. at 178.
301 Id.
302 See S.C. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-20 (2001) (last amended 1996). Likewise, in Pennsyl-
vania, the only other State which refuses to instruct capital juries that defendants would be
ineligible for parole under a life sentence, the death penalty is also applied to first degree
murders committed under aggravating circumstances. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711 (1998).
303 Amicus Brief at 7, Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 (2001) (No. 00-5250).
304 Id. at 9. Ultimately, fifty-three of the 187 South Carolina jurors responded that the
prosecutor had not raised the issue "at all." Id. at app.A.
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fendant from killing again either "a great deal" or "a fair amount"
during deliberations."' Additionally, sixty-one percent reported dis-
cussing the issue of how likely the defendant was to be paroled either
"a great deal" or "a fair amount."30 6 Hence, a significant majority of
South Carolina juries explicitly discussed issues regarding future
dangerousness and parole eligibility even though the prosecutor did
not explicitly raise the issue of future dangerousness.3 7 Indeed,
fifty-two percent of these jurors indicated that when considering
which punishment to mete out, they were either "greatly concerned"
or "somewhat concerned" that the defendant might return to society
one day if not sentenced to death.30 8 As further discussed below,
these results should surprise no one. Capital crimes are generally
gruesome and violent, and raise the specter of future dangerousness
by their very nature.
A further legal argument supporting a presumption that future
dangerousness is always at issue in capital trials was unwittingly sup-
plied in the Petitioner's Brief in Shafer,"9 The brief argued that the
issue of future dangerousness had indeed been raised at Shafer's
trial,3"' and in so doing noted what evidence has been deemed to es-
tablish future dangerousness in prior cases.31' For example, in Ramos
the Court commented that the "jury's evaluation of the defendant's
future dangerousness may rest on lay testimony about the defendant's
character and background and the inferences to be drawn there-
from."3 '2 In States where future dangerousness is a formal statutory
element in capital cases, the circumstances of the offense itself have
been held sufficient to support a finding of future dangerousness be-
yond a reasonable doubt.3"3 And in the same context, the United
305 Id. at 9 n.9.
306 Id. at 9.
307 The study also revealed that fifty-three percent of these jurors had explicitly dis-
cussed the threat posed by the defendant if he were ever to be placed back in society, either
"a great deal" or "a fair amount." Id. at 9. And fifty-seven percent of the jurors reported
discussing the amount of time they anticipated before the defendant would be released under
a life sentence, either "a great deal" or "a fair amount." Id. at 9 n.9.
308 Id. at 10. And when asked how important "keeping the defendant from ever killing
again" was to their decision, forty-three percent responded that it was "very important" and
twenty-six percent responded that it was "somewhat important." Id. at 10 n.10.
309 Petitioner's Opening Brief at 25, Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 (2001) (No.
00-5250).
310 Id. at 25.
311 Id. at 26-29.
312 Id. at 26 (citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1006 n.20 (1983)).
31I Id. at 28-29 (citing Pope v. Commonwealth, 360 S.E.2d 352, 361 (Va. 1987); Bell v.
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States Supreme Court has found future dangerousness to have been
proven merely by the introduction of evidence concerning the defen-
dant's prior criminal acts.314 All of these holdings verify that the
standard fare of capital murder trials intrinsically raise the issue of,
and indeed conclusively prove, the future dangerousness of the de-
fendant.
Finally, scrutiny of the Supreme Court's prior decisions reveals
that it, too, has presumed that the issue of future dangerousness will
be raised in capital trials. For instance, in Jurek the Court remarked
that "any sentencing authority must predict a convicted person's
probable future conduct when it engages in the process of determin-
ing what punishment to impose." '315 In Skipper the Court reaffirmed
that "[c]onsideration of a defendant's past conduct as indicative of his
probable future behavior is an inevitable and not undesirable element
of criminal sentencing." '316
Moreover, the notion that future dangerousness will almost al-
ways be at issue in a capital trial is implied by the plurality's reason-
ing in Simmons itself. There, the Court first found that most jurors
might very well presume that a capital defendant sentenced to life
imprisonment would be eligible for parole. 7 However, the Court
also found that a reasonable juror would find a capital defendant who
is eligible for parole to be a prospective threat to society.3"8 The syl-
logistic conclusion to be draw from these two findings is that future
dangerousness will almost always be at issue in South Carolina capi-
tal trials for the very reason that jurors mistakenly presume that the
defendant is eligible for parole. In fact, this inference has been con-
firmed by CJP research.319 Analysis of the information provided by
former capital jurors has revealed that the earlier a given juror antici-
pated the defendant would be released on parole, the more likely they
were to believe that the evidence proved the defendant was danger-
ous, and the more likely they were to be "greatly concerned" about
State, 938 S.W.2d 35, 42 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).
314 Id. at 29 (citing Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 355 (1993)). Significantly, in the
sentencing phase of the Shafer trial the prosecutor had presented evidence concerning
Shafer's criminal record, past aggressive conduct, probation violations and misbehavior in
prison. See Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 41 (2001).
315 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976).
316 Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986).
317 Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 169-70 (1994). See also id. at 177-78
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
318 Id. at 163.
319 Bowers & Steiner, supra note 266, at 667-70.
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the defendant's possible return to society ."' Likewise, in forming
their sentencing decision, those jurors who anticipated an early re-
lease were more likely to regard keeping the defendant from killing
again as "very important.""3 ' Indeed, this pattern held true regardless
of whether the prosecution had made explicit arguments as to the de-
fendant's future dangerousness. 322 As the CJP researchers reported,
"[t]he clear implication is that jurors' release perceptions bear on
their judgments of the defendant's dangerousness, and in turn, on
their decision-making on punishment. Mistaken release estimates
evidently promote the perception that the defendant will be danger-
ous in the future."32 So while the Court's implied syllogism in Sim-
mons may have been uninteded, in fact it was dead on.
All of these arguments support the intuition that future danger-
ousness will invariably be a significant factor in capital sentencing.
Hence, even if the Court were to continue to apply the analytical
framework developed in Simmons, the requirement of a particularized
showing that future dangerousness was placed at issue by the porse-
cutor should be dropped. Statistical evidence and the Court's own
precedent clearly supports a presumption that future dangerousness
will be a crucial factor for a capital jury, even when the prosecutor
declines to explicitly raise the issue. However, even if one were to
assume away the issue of future dangerousness as a consideration in
juror decision making, the case for abandoning the future dangerous-
ness requirement would remain.
3. Beyond Future Dangerousness
The capital juries in Simmons,3 24 Ramdass,325 and Shafer,326 all
made inquiries as to whether the defendant would be eligible for pa-
role. Indeed, as discussed above, researchers have found that as
many as one quarter of capital juries that return the death sentence
make inquiries concerning the possibility of parole.327 However,
what these cases do not tell us is why the jurors made these inquiries.
One might presume that these inquiries were motivated by a desire to
320 Id. at 668-70.
321 Id.
322 Id. at 668.
323 Id. at 670.
324 Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 160 (1994).
325 Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 162 (2000).
326 Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 48 (2001).
327 Lane, supra note 294, at 335-36.
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be sure that the defendant would be permanently taken off the streets.
Yet there is another possibility. The questions could have been moti-
vated by a simple desire to see that the punishment fits the crime.
3 28
The Supreme Court has recognized that "retribution clearly plays
a more prominent role in capital cases. 329 Indeed, one Justice went
so far as to contend that "in the context of capital felony cases.., the
question of whether the death sentence is an appropriate non-
excessive response to the particular facts of the case will depend on
the retribution justification.""33 In calibrating the proper degree of
retribution, the Eighth Amendment demands an informed and rea-
soned moral response.33" ' The jury must not only consider, but must
be able to "give effect to a defendant's mitigating evidence in impos-
ing sentence. ' '91 2  In practice, however, the jury must ultimately
choose between two or more statutorily defined sentences. Hence,
their ability to "give effect to" the defendant's mitigating evidence is
contingent on their accurate understanding of what those alternatives
really mean. Where a jury comes to the reasoned moral determi na-
tion that the defendant truly deserves a life-long punishment short of
death, the mistaken belief that a sentence of life imprisonment merely
amounts to a term of years may very well compel them to accept
death as the most appropriate sentence available. In such a case, the
jury would lack "a vehicle for expressing its 'reasoned moral re-
sponse,"' 333 due entirely to its easily correctable ignorance of the law.
And mitigating evidence presented by the defendant would be pre-
vented from having any practical impact on the sentencing decision.
Indeed, the CJP analysis of capital jury decision-making revealed
that the lower a juror's estimate of the time actually spent in prison
328 Other commentators have also expounded on the role of retribution in capital sentenc-
ing. See Bowers & Steiner, supra note 266, at 623-35.
329 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 462 (1984). See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 183 (1976) ("In part, capital punishment is an expression of society's moral outrage at
particularly offensive conduct.").
330 Id. at 480 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
331 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989).
332 Id. See also Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377-78 (1990) ("The Eighth
Amendment requires that the jury be able to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigat-
ing evidence offered by petitioner."); Crane v. Kentuky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)) ("the Constitution guarantees criminal
defendants 'a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense."').
333 Penry, 492 U.S. at 328. Some commentators have further argued that not only is it
necessary that jurors know they have a choice of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole where such is the case, but that the Eighth Amendment demands that they have that
alternative in the first place. See generally, Lane, supra note 297.
2002]
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
by those sentenced to life imprisonment, the higher the likelihood
that the juror would vote for death.334 Significantly, this pattern held
even where jurors indicated that issues related to future dangerous-
ness did not play a significant role in their deliberations. 33' Hence,
CJP researchers concluded that juror misperception of the signifi-
cance of "life imprisonment" had most likely skewed the process of
calibrating the appropriate degree of retribution in favor of death.336
These facts show the fallacy of the Court's insistence on direct-
ing the inquiry toward the actions of the prosecutor in raising the is-
sue of future dangerousness. The real problem is not prosecutorial
hedging; the real problem is rampant jury ignorance as to the basic
terms of their sentencing task. Perhaps the Simmons Court was moti-
vated by a desire to identify the problem with something it could
more readily get a handle on, something perceptible within the trial
record. However, in reality the problem is pervasive and may quite
readily defy outward perception unless the jury is specifichlly polled
on the subject after the fact.337 The appropriate solution is clear: fix
the procedure itself by establishing an unqualified Eighth Amend-
ment right to obtain an instruction that a capital defendant would be
ineligible for parole if sentenced to life imprisonment. To do any-
thing less would only ensure that there is at least some subset of capi-
tal defendants who will be sentenced to death on the arbitrary and ca-
pricious basis of juror ignorance.
Indeed, this argument is best illustrated by the facts in Shafer it-
self. According to the trial judge in that case, the prosecution had not
effectively raised the issue of Shafer's future dangerousness. 38 Yet
the jury's questionnaire demonstrates both that the issue of parole
was a critical factor in its sentencing determination, and that the jury
was ignorant of what the State's parole policy actually was.339 Thus,
whether concerned with future dangerousness or retribution, the jury
334 Bowers & Steiner, supra note 266, at 655 tbl.3 (noting that there is a twenty-five
point difference in the percentage ofjurors who estimated that the defendant would be out in
zero to nine years and who voted for death (68.5%), and the percentage of jurors who esti-
mated that the defendant would actually serve twenty or more years and who voted for death
(43.1%)).
335 Id. at 667.
336 Id.
337 In fact, this was attempted by Shafer's counsel, but was expressly denied. Shafer v.
South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 45-46 (2001).
338 Id. at 42. This point was also conceded by Chief Justice Finney in his dissent. State
v. Shafer, 531 S.E.2d 524, 534 n.2 (S.C., 2000).
339 Shafer, 532 U.S. at 44.
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may very well have sentenced Shafer to death on the basis of its mis-
perception of the law. Shafer itself demonstrates that the Simmons
rule is insufficient to prevent the imposition of the death sentence on
the basis of arbitrary and capricious grounds.
4. The Alternative Sentence Restriction Should Be Dropped
The rule ultimately adopted in Simmons is contingent not only on
the prosecutor raising the issue of future dangerousness, but also on
the fact that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is the
only sentencing alternative to death.34° Unfortunately, the Court
never tells us why this qualification is necessary, or even relevant.
However, the South Carolina Supreme Court did venture an argument
in a companion case to the Shafer decision, State v. Starnes.34' There,
the South Carolina Supreme Court argued that "the rationale for
Simmons simply does not exist when there is a potential mandatory
minimum thirty year sentence. Contrary to a sentence of life impris-
onment without the possibility of parole, a mandatory minimum
thirty year sentence does not rebut the argument regarding the defen-
dant's threat to society. '  However, this argument falls apart upon
critical scrutiny. It is true that the option of a mandatory minimum
thirty-year sentence does nothing to implicate the "false dilemma"
identified in Simmons, nor does it rebut the prosecutor's implied ar-
gument of a future threat upon release. Yet the presence of this third
sentencing option does absolutely nothing to dispel these problems
either.
The false dilemma identified in Simmons occurs when the jury
wrongly believes that it must choose between a sentence of death or a
de facto term of years. Hence, the only way to keep the defendant
permanently off the streets is through the sentence of death. This
problem is exacerbated to the extent that the prosecutor raises the is-
sue of future dangerousness, because the jury will become more mo-
tivated to keep the defendant off the streets permanently, one way or
the other. On the other hand, the prosecutor's squeeze-play can be
rebutted by properly informing the jury of the true meaning of a life
term.
Injecting another sentencing option into the equation does not al-
ter this dilemma. Jurors interested in keeping the defendant off the
340 Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 178 (1994).
341 531 S.E.2d 907 (S.C. 2000).
342 Id. at 916.
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street permanently will likely reject a term of years sentence out of
hand. This still leaves the same possibility for error in sentencing as
before: the jury may vote for death if they erroneously believe that
the defendant would be eligible for parole if sentenced to life
imprisonment. Nor is there a compelling argument to be made that
the presence of a term of years as a sentencing option will imply to
the jury that a life sentence is without the possibility of parole. As
the Court noted in Simmons, jurors generally presume that a life
sentence carries with it the possibility of parole, 43 and the presence
of a lesser sentencing alternative is not likely to change this. In fact,
the CJP found that one capital jury actually sentenced the defendant
to a term of years rather than life imprisonment, precisely because
they believed that the defendant would actually serve more time
under the term of years.344
While the argument in favor of qualifying the Simmons rule ac-
cording to the availability of a third alternative sentence is vacuous,
the case for abandoning such a restriction is obvious. The alternative
sentence qualification continues to permit jury misperception of the
law to inject an element of arbitrariness and capriciousness into capi-
tal sentencing decisions for a subset of capital defendants. There is
simply no rational justification for resolving the danger the Court
clearly recognized in Simmons by half-measures.34 A jury that
would be inclined to impose the death penalty on the basis of the mis-
taken belief that a prospective life sentence entails the possibility of
parole will not be deterred by the mere presence of an alternative
lesser sentence. Yet this potential for fatal error could be effectively
countered by simply giving a full and accurate jury instruction.
5. The Issue of Judicial Economy
Concerns for judicial economy clearly weigh in favor of a sim-
pler unqualified rule of disclosure.346 This is best illustrated by the
facts of Shafer itself. Had the Court originally adopted a rule unfet-
tered by qualifications, they never would have had to deal with this
343 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 169-70.
344 Bowers & Steiner, supra note 266, at 695.
345 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 161-62.
346 As the Seventh Circuit has recognized in another context, "[c]oncerns of judicial
economy often enter the analysis of whether to adopt or maintain a given rule or test." Erick-
son v. Trinity Theatre, 13 F.3d 1061, 1069 n.6 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Ankenbrandt v. Rich-
ards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501
U.S. 350 (1991)).
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case in the first place. As the Court itself recognized, Shafer is noth-
ing if not a redux of Simmons. 47 It was a complete waste of the
Court's valuable time. During the 2000 term, there were 7,852 cases
filed with the Supreme Court, but only eighty-six of those cases were
argued before the Court and only seventy-seven signed opinions
were produced.34 Hence, the obtuse qualifications of the Simmons
rule have already wasted judicial resources at the highest level. And
the case is not over yet. Shafer was remanded for a determination on
the issue of future dangerousness, and may yet reappear before the
Court.349
An unqualified rule would save judicial resources at all levels.
The trial court in Shafer would have had no need to wrestle with the
issue of whether the prosecutor had "crossed the line" in alluding to
Shafer's future dangerousness.35 ° Moreover, by allowing the State to
deny jurors information they need to make an accurate sentencing de-
termination, their task can only be prolonged and made more arduous
than it already is. Commentators have identified numerous instances
in which juror frustration has made itself known.35' This purposeless
anxiety is made even more egregious because it is founded on igno-
rance of a simple legal fact, easily correctable by a full and accurate
jury instruction. An unqualified rule would alleviate this difficulty,
making the trial and deliberation process more efficient in all cases
where life imprisonment without parole is a sentencing alternative.
By declining to implement an unqualified rule of disclosure in
347 Shafer, 532 U.S. at 474-48.
348 Supreme Court of the United States, 2001 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary,
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2001 year-endreport.html.
341 Shafer, 532 U.S. at 53. Indeed, since Shafer was decided the Court has already
wasted another valuable space on its docket. In Kelly v. South Carolina, the Court re-
affirmed its holding in Shafer, and reversed the death sentence because the prosecutor in that
case had raised the issue of future dangerousness. 122 S.Ct. 726, 728-29 (2002). While that
opinion added little in the way of rationale for the Simmons rule, it did contain some interest-
ing developments. Justice O'Connor joined the Simmons plurality in finding that the prose-
cutor's statements had raised the issue of future dangerousness. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Kennedy dissented, arguing for a strict interpretation of the future dangerousness
qualification in the Simmons rule. Id. at 734-36. Most significantly, the Court is now bick-
ering over an obtuse distinction that never should have been drawn in the first place.
"0 Shafer, 532 U.S. at 43.
351 See generally Bowers & Steiner, supra note 266 (citing numerous trial records and
juror interviews evincing juror disgust at not being informed of the basic terms of their sen-
tencing decision). See also Lane, supra note 294, at 241-43 (reporting that one jury actually




Shafer, the Court merely created more valueless work for itself, for
trial courts, and for jurors in the future, and perpetuated the potential
for the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty.
In sum, there appears to be no rational basis for restricting the
Simmons rule to those cases where the prosecutor explicitly argues
the issue of future dangerousness. The issue of future dangerousness
is most often raised in the minds of jurors by the facts of the capital
crime itself, and even where it is not jurors still need complete and
accurate information as to the basic terms of their sentencing decision
in order to determine the appropriate degree of punishment. Like-
wise, there appears to be no rational basis for restricting the Simmons
rule to those cases where there is no alternative to death other than
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The presence of a
third sentencing alternative does nothing to dispel the false dilemma
created by juror ignorance of the basic terms of their sentencing task.
Finally, the qualified rule in Simmons cannot help but waste judicial
resources and has already done so, as demonstrated by Shafer itself
This leads one to question whether the obtuse rule laid out in Sim-
mons was somehow mandated by the mechanics and inertia of prior
precedent. Upon close scrutiny, it is clear that this is not the case.
6. The Constitutional Grounds for an Unqualified Rule of Disclosure
The most appropriate legal basis for an unqualified rule of dis-
closure of a capital defendant's parole ineligibility would be that pro-
posed by Justice Souter in his concurrence in Simmons.352 Justice
Souter contended that the decision should have been grounded on the
Eighth Amendment principle that, because of its unique severity and
finality, the death penalty may only be imposed on the basis of a fully
informed and reasoned moral response.353 This is the principle that
was first established in Furman, and further developed in Gregg.354
Indeed, in Gregg the Court explicitly recognized that "accurate sen-
tencing information is an indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned de-
termination of whether a defendant shall live or die by a jury of peo-
ple who may never before have made a sentencing decision." '355 As
352 Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 172 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring).
Other commentators have also advocated adopting Justice Souter's approach. See, e.g.,
Janice Clark, Note, Putting an End to the hnposition of Death by Misperception and Misun-
derstanding: Simmons v. South Carolina, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 1147,1164 (1995).
353 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 172 (Souter, J., concurring).
354 Id. at 172-73.
355 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976). See also Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S.
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Justice Souter noted, this Eighth Amendment mandate has consis-
tently been held to invalidate procedural rules that tend to interfere
with the formation of an accurate sentencing determination.356 Thus,
under these basic principles of the Court's death penalty jurispru-
dence, the appropriate rule would surely be one of unqualified disclo-
sure of a capital defendant's statutory parole ineligibility under a life
sentence.357
In addition, the Court has also recognized that the Eighth
Amendment proscription of cruel and unusual punishment is a dy-
namic principle, evolving with public standards of decency.3 58  An
unqualified rule of disclosure appears to be warranted on this basis as
well. As the Petitioner's Brief in Shafer documents, of the thirty
States which both employ juries in capital sentencing and provide life
imprisonment without parole as an alternative to death, twenty-seven
of those States disclose to the jury that the defendant would be parole
ineligible.359 One State has not addressed the issue.36 And only two
States now engage in the practice of refusing to inform the jury of the
defendant's parole ineligibitility, where possible under Simmons:
South Carolina and Pennsylvania.36 Significantly, at the time Sim-
mons was decided the Commonwealth of Virginia also engaged in
this practice.362 However, in Yarborough v. Commonwealth the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court overturned the prior rule and instituted an un-
conditional rule of disclosure of a capital defendant's parole ineligi-
bility.363 Recognizing the restricted nature of the Court's holding in
Simmons, the Virginia Supreme Court declined to base its decision on
the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment.3 64  Rather, the Virginia Su-
preme Court based its decision on the Commonwealth's constitu-
639, 653 (1990) ("When ajury is the final sentencer, it is essential that the jurors be properly
instructed regarding all facets of the sentencing process.")
356 Id.
357 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 172 (Souter, J., concurring).
358 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 172-73.
359 Appellant's Brief at laa app.B, Shafer (No. 00-5250). Some States explicitly instruct
the jury that the defendant would be ineligible for parole, and others simply describe the al-
ternative as "life imprisonment without the possibility of parole," while still others allow the
jury to choose if the defendant will be eligible for parole or not. Id. at laa-2aa.
360 Id. at 3aa.
361 Id. See also, State v. Shafer, 531 S.E.2d 524 (S.C., 2000); Commonwealth v.
Speight, 677 A.2d 317, 326 (Pa. 1996).
362 See Simmons, 512 U.S. at 168 n.8.
363 Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 602, 615 (Va. 1999).
364 Id. at 612.
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tional right to a trial by an informed jury.365 Ironically, this is pre-
cisely the principle that the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized to be
mandated by the Eighth Amendment in the context of capital pun-
ishment.366 This holding further illuminates the unwarranted nature
of the qualified rule in Simmons.
7. The Absence of a Constitutional Justification for the Qualified Rule of
Simmons
While an unqualified rule of disclosure would clearly be in ac-
cord with the basic principles of the Supreme Court's modem death
penalty jurisprudence, the same cannot be said for the qualified rule
established in Simmons. As discussed above, the Simmons rule was
predicated on Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in that case.
367
However, that concurrence provides little in the way of rational justi-
fication for requiring disclosure only "[w]here the State puts the de-
fendant's future dangerousness in issue, and the only available alter-
native sentence to death is life imprisonment without possibility of
parole., 368 Rather, the adoption of a qualified rule appears to rest on
two legalistic maneuvers. First, Justice O'Connor cites to Skipper v.
South Carolina and Gardner v. Florida for the proposition that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a capi-
tal defendant's right to rebut arguments made against him by the
prosecutor.369 By basing her decision on the due process right of re-
buttal, rather than the broader Eight Amendment mandate that capital
juries make fully informed decisions, Justice O'Connor laid the
groundwork for a rule which is triggered only by the action of the
prosecutor. Second, Justice O'Connor cites to California v. Ramos
for the proposition that the Court should defer to the States on the is-
sue of whether to inform juries of a capital defendant's prospective
early release.37 However, all of these cases were either misrepre-
sented or can be amply distinguished from the facts presented in both
Simmons and Shafer.
First, Skipper"' was decided on the basis of the Eighth Amend-
365 Id. at 613.
366 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189-90 (1976).
367 Unfortunately, the opinion in Shafer does little more than repeat the basic reasoning
in Simmons. See Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 49 (2001).
368 Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 178 (1994).
369 Id. at 175-76.
370 Id. at 176.
371 Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
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ment right to present all mitigating evidence necessary to allow the
jury to make a fully informed decision, not the due process right of
rebuttal. This fact was made crystal clear by Justice Powell's concur-
rence in that case.372 It was only the concurring minority that argued
for a narrower holding based on the due process right of rebuttal.373
Although the majority acknowledged that such grounds were a valid
basis for decision,374 it ultimately decided the case on the basis of the
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence established in Locket v. Ohio and
Eddings v. Oklahoma.375 Specifically, the majority found that "evi-
dence that the defendant would not pose a danger if spared (but in-
carcerated) must be considered potentially mitigating. Under Ed-
dings, such evidence may not be excluded from the sentencer's
consideration." '376 Hence, in reality Skipper lends more credence to
an unqualified rule of disclosure based on the Eight Amendment, as
advocated by Justice Souter in Simmons,377 rather than the qualified
rule laid down by Justice O'Connor.
Second, the Court in Simmons understated the degree to which
the facts of that case, and of Shafer, map on to the holding in Gard-
ner. Both the plurality opinion and the concurrence by Justice
O'Connor assert that the principle holding in Gardner is that due
process does not allow a defendant to be sentenced to death "on the
basis of information he had no opportunity to deny or explain.
378
However, the "information" at issue in Gardner was not evidence
submitted by the prosecutor. 37 9 Rather, it was a pre-sentence report
ordered by the trial judge, to which neither the defense nor the prose-
cutor had complete access. 38" Hence, the information at issue was in-
formation autonomously attained by the sentencing authority.
Likewise, the real threat of arbitrary prejudice posed to Jonathan
Simmons and Wesley Shafer was not the arguments made by their
prosecutors. The real threat was posed by the misinformation likely
to have been autonomously attained by the jurors themselves prior to
372 Id. at I I (Powell, J., concurring).
373 Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
374 Id. at 5 n. 1.
375 Id. at 4-5.
376 Id. at 5.
377 Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 172-74 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring).
378 Id. at 175 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Gardner, 430 U.S. at 362); see also id.
at 164 (plurality opinion).




trial. As discussed above, the Court in Simmons acknowledged that
where South Carolina jurors are forced to guess as to a capital defen-
dant's parole eligibility, they would most likely guess that he was pa-
role eligible. This misperception, attained due to the long-standing
practice of granting such parole and exacerbated by sensationalism in
the mass media and political rhetoric, may prove crucial to the fate of
a capital defendant; no less so than the information contained in
Gardner's pre-sentence report. And for all the Court knew, the in-
formation in the Gardner report may have been factually correct.
The problem was that the defendant was denied an opportunity to en-
sure that was the case. By contrast, the State of South Carolina
would deny capital defendants the opportunity to ensure that jurors
accurately perceived the nature of a life sentence, even though there
is ample evidence that they are likely to guess wrongly on that point
if, as the State insists, they are required to guess.
Ultimately, Gardner stands for the proposition that a capital de-
fendant has a constitutional right to deny or explain potentially preju-
dicial information autonomously obtained by his sentencer. In Sim-
mons, the Court recognized that South Carolina jurors are likely to
have autonomously obtained a faulty conception of what a sentence
of life imprisonment means for a capital convict. Hence, in reality
Gardner, like Skipper, supports an unqualified rule of disclosure and
illustrates that the real problem is the ignorance of jurors, not the ar-
guments of prosecutors.
Finally, Ramos38' was a poorly reasoned decision that can be
distinguished on its most pertinent facts. In Ramos, the Court
reversed a decision by the California Supreme Court by upholding
the constitutionality of the Briggs Initiative.382 This California law
required State court judges to instruct capital juries that the Governor
had the power to commute a sentence of life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole.383 However, these courts were not permitted
to mention that the Governor may likewise commute a death sen-
tenccVW8o principle arguments were raised against the Briggs Instruc-
tion. First, the defendant argued that the prospect of a life sentence
being commuted by the Governor was far too speculative to be prop-
erly considered by a jury, and could only increase the chance that a
381 California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
382 Id. at 1013-14.
383 Id. at 995.
384 Id. at 1012.
[Vol. 93
SHAFER v. SOUTH CAROLINA
sentence of death would be predicated on arbitrary and capricious
grounds, thereby violating the Eighth Amendment.385 Such an
ephemeral possibility could easily be blown out of proportion by a
jury of laypersons invited to speculate about the legal and political
mechanics of the commutation process. Second, the defendant ar-
gued that the Briggs Instruction improperly skewed the jury's percep-
tion of the law, leading them to believe that commutation was possi-
ble for those sentenced to life but not for those sentenced to death.386
As a result, jurors were left with the impression that the only way to
be sure that the defendant would permanently be kept off the streets
would be to sentence him to death.
The Court first responded by asserting that the true function of
the Briggs Instruction was to invite the jury to consider the defen-
dant's future dangerousness, a consideration that had been expressly
authorized in Jurek v. Texas.387 The Court found that "[t]he instruc-
tion invites the jury to predict not so much what some future Gover-
nor might do, but more what the defendant himself might do if re-
leased into society." '388 It further contended that the instruction was
but one of many factors to be considered by a jury, and would not
necessarily be a dispositive factor in a capital jury's decision-making
process.389 As to the second issue, the Court merely denied that a bal-
ancing instruction informing juries that the Governor could also
commute a death sentence would be effective.39° The Court theorized
that such a balancing instruction would actually prejudice the defen-
dant because it would lead the jury to believe that a sentence of death
would not be final, but would rather be subject to review by the Gov-
ernor.
39 1
However, these arguments are manifestly inadequate. First, the
Briggs Instruction invites the jury to speculate on the defendant's fu-
ture dangerousness only in relation to the possibility that the defen-
dant's sentence would be commuted by a future Governor. Hence,
misguided juror speculation on the prospect of commutation seems
unescapable. Secondly, the Briggs Instruction clearly operates as a
rhetorical ploy. By instructing the jury about the Governor's commu-
385 id. at 998.
386 Id. at 1010.
387 Id. at 1003.
388 Id. at 1005.
389 Id. at 1008-09.




tation power with regard to one sentencing alternative, but remaining
silent as to the other, the clear implication is that only the one alterna-
tive may be commuted. This effect is well recognized by the maxim,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius9 ' By accurately informing the
jury as to the full extent of the law, this effect is defeated. Moreover,
as Justice Marshall pointed out in his vehement dissent, even if the
Court were right about the prejudicial effect of a prospective balanc-
ing instruction, the obvious solution would be to simply ban the
Briggs Instruction outright.393 That would have been the most effec-
tive alternative.
In the final analysis, the Court never even directly engages the
arguments made against the constitutionality of the Briggs Instruc-
tion. After picking apart the majority's faulty reasoning, Justice Mar-
shall lamented that:
I had thought it was common ground that the capital sentencing process must be reli-
able, as rational, and as free of mistakes as is humanly possible. Yet the Court up-
holds the Briggs Instruction without ever disputing its substantial potential to mislead.
The Court thus authorizes the State to "cross the line of neutrality" and encourage
death sentences by deceiving the jury.
394
In fact, the reasoning in Ramos was so unpersuasive that upon re-
mand the California Supreme Court promptly struck down the Briggs
Instruction once again, this time on the basis of the California State
Constitution.395
However, there is one basic principle of the Court's death pen-
alty jurisprudence that lends credence to the outcome in Ramos, and
this principle no doubt drove that decision. Importantly, this princi-
ple is fundamentally inapplicable to the facts in Simmons and Shafer.
From the beginning of its modem scrutiny of capital punishment pro-
cedures, the Court has recognized that the Eighth Amendment's pro-
scription of cruel and unusual punishment is a dynamic principle,
changing to reflect our evolving community values.396 This recogni-
tion in turn implies that the Court should give state legislators wide
latitude in deciding the terms on which capital punishment may be
imposed, because state legislators are in a better position to assess the
392 "Expressing only one of two related ideas implies the exclusion of the other."
393 Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1017-18 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
394 Id. at 1018 (Marshall, J. dissenting) (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,
523 (1968)).
See generally, California v. Ramos, 689 P.2d 430 (Cal. 1984).
396 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 239, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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contemporary values of the community.397 In this regard, the case for
upholding the Briggs Instruction was especially strong because that
instruction was mandated by a voter initiative 98 If state legislators
are in a better position to assess the values of the community than
judges, then a popular vote would seem the best gauge of all. Ac-
cordingly, the holding in Ramos is characterized as one of deference
to the state legislative process.399 The Court wrote, "We sit as judges,
not as legislators, and the wisdom of the decision to permit juror con-
sideration of possible commutation is best left to the states.""'
However, this principle of deference to the legislative process is
clearly inapplicable to the facts of Simmons and Shafer. The South
Carolina rule prohibiting juries from being informed as to the parole
ineligibility of capital defendants was not the product of a voter ini-
tiative or legislative process."0 It was judicially mandated by the
South Carolina Supreme Court.40 2 In Ramos, the United States Su-
preme Court showed no deference to the California Supreme Court in
overturning its decision as to the constitutionality of the Briggs In-
struction. Likewise, the Court owes no deference to the decisions of
the South Carolina Supreme Court, particularly where the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution are impli-
cated. Moreover, it seems self-evident that fully informing jurors as
to the basic terms of their sentencing decision better comports with
our contemporary community values. As discussed above, the CJP
has extensively documented the frustration and outrage of former
capital jurors at not being fully informed of their sentencing deci-
sion.403 Moreover, the jurors in Simmons and Shafer seemed to have
concurred in this sentiment, as their questionnaires to the trial judge
demonstrate.4 4
In the end, whether one relies on the Eighth Amendment juris-
prudence arising out of Furman and Gregg, or the Fourteenth
Amendment principles established in Gardner, the case for a blanket
397 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 174-76 (1976).
398 Ramos, 463 U.S. at 995 n.4.
399 Id. at 1013-14.
400 Id. at 1014.
40! See generally, S.C. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-20 (2001) (no statutory rule against disclosure
of a capital defendant's parole ineligibility).
402 See State v. Shafer, 531 S.E.2d 524, 529 (S.C., 2000).
403 See Bowers & Steiner, supra note 266 and accompanying text.
404 Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 160 (1994); Shafer v. South Carolina, 532
U.S. 36, 48-9 (2001).
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rule allowing all capital defendants to inform the jury of their parole
ineligibility under a life sentence is manifest. Ample evidence dem-
onstrates that jurors are likely to misperceive a capital defendant's
parole eligibility, as well as the amount of time that will pass before
his release. In that this misperception exacerbates the issue of future
dangerousness, along with the facts of the capital crime itself, that is-
sue may be presumed to be raised in a capital trial regardless of what
the prosecutor argues. What's more, even where future dangerous-
ness is not considered a significant issue at all, the prejudicial effect
of juror misperception concerning parole may still be manifest in de-
termining which punishment best fits the crime. Finally, by formulat-
ing a rule with awkward and unwarranted exceptions, the Court has
already wasted judicial resources at all levels. For all these reasons,
an unconditional rule of disclosure ought to be promulgated.
VII. CONCLUSION
Ultimately the argument for an unconditional Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendment mandate that capital juries be informed of a de-
fendant's parole ineligibility falls back on simple common sense. If
due process is to mean anything in the context of capital sentencing,
it should mean that jurors are adequately informed as to the legal
framework upon which they must make their decision as to life or
death. There is simply no justification for a system that insists on
jeopardizing the lives of defendants based not on a reasoned moral
judgment, but on common juror misunderstandings of which all are
aware. Likewise, there is no justification for increasing the anxiety
of jurors charged with this weighty task by insisting that they fumble
about in the dark when it would be effortless to illuminate the true
consequences of their decision. There is simply no valid reason for
the Court to qualify the protection of the Simmons rule, thereby leav-
ing the door open for the near certain likelihood that some future exe-
cutions will be predicated on the arbitrary and capricious basis of eas-
ily foreseeable and correctable juror ignorance. In the end, the
missed opportunity in Shafer seems another tragic instance of the
blind leading the blind.
William Baarsma
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